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I shall argue that the Interactive Party-State (IPS) model (Csanádi,
1997) allows us to place the Chinese and Hungarian party-state
structure and dynamics into a common framework. This framework
sheds light on the structural reasons behind the different functional
effects of reforms. This paper is divided into three major parts. In the
first section I summarize the structural and dynamic properties of the
IPS model. This is followed by arguments raised regarding its general
nature, and consequently, the applicability of the model to China based
on common structural and operational grounds. Finally, I will reveal
that behind the robust common ground, the different structural
specifics may give rise to the divergent development paths. The
primary focus is theoretical, with empirical examples provided.
Consistent empirical analysis based on the model will be a following
undertaking.
                                                
1 This work is the theoretical introductory to a book in the making, that compares Hun-
garian and Chinese structure and reforms in the context of the described model. The




VÁLTOZÁSAIT ÉRTELMEZŐ INTERAKTIV MODEL
AZ ÚJRATERMELŐDÉS, A BOMLÁS ÉS AZ ÁTALAKULÁS
AZONOSSÁGAINAK ÉS ELTÉRÉSEINEK
STRUKTURÁLIS ÉS DINAMIKAI HÁTTERE
Összefoglaló
Az interaktív párt-állami modell (Csanádi, 1997), a párt-államok
szerkezetének, működésének és átakulásának elemzésére szolgáló
általános eszköz. A modell segítségével a párt-állami hatalmi szerkezet
és annak dinamikája közös keretbe foglalható. Az elméleti eszköz
segítségével rávilágíthatunk a rendszer eltérő újratermelődési
folyamatának strukturális hátterére is és megmagyarázhatjuk a
strukturális eltérések hatását is e rendszerek valtozására és
átalakulására. A tanulmány három részből áll. Az első a modell
strukturális építőelemeit és dinamikai sajátosságait foglalja össze. A
második rész a modell általános alkalmazhatóságát taglalja a párt-
államok közös strukturális és működésbeli sajátosságaira alapozva. A
harmadik részben arra világítok rá, hogy az alapvető közös strukturális
és működésbeli sajátosságokon belül hogyan értelmezhetőek az egyes
párt-államok hatalmi struktúrabeli eltérései és ezek hatása eltérő
működésükre és eltérő fejlődési útjaikra. A tanulmány alapvetően
elméleti jellegű. Az elméleti érvek illusztrálására konkrét példákkal két
egymástól sokféle szempontból távol álló szocialista ország – Kína és
Magyarország – szerkezeti sajátosságai es reformjai szolgálnak.5
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INTRODUCTION
"In searching for an approach to guide research into the nature of state
socialism, we need a model, which incorporates culture and values and is
sensitive to the role of politics and the nature of the economy." (Lane,
1976; 63)
Long theoretical debates may be traced in the 1930s on the capability of
the planning in socialism to successfully simulating the market (Hayek,
1975). These debates were necessarily bound to their period since could
not use the experience of the multitude of party-states born after the 1930s.
An overwhelming quantity of literature was born on totalitarianism
accentuating the supremacy and total dominance of politics and the ruling
elite in the social system. These theories, defined during the Cold War
period as a counter ideology of Soviet Marxism (Lane, 1976; 44), could
not come to grips with the differences among totalitarian party-states and
their departure from the Stalinist model. Similar problems emerged when
party-states were defined as monolith constructs, neglecting both the
structural differences among and within them and the fuel of
development
2.
There are powerful theories on the economic operation of these sys-
tems: on the functioning of central planning (Kornai, 1959), on the eco-
                                                
2 In the 1970s, David Lane defined the shortcomings of the different approaches to
analyze state-socialism as follows: "While each theory provides some valuable insight,
non provides us with a model with which we may do justice to the complexity of the
kind of society we are studying. We have criticized the Soviet Marxist model because it
gives no prominent place to conflict and does not adequately show how under
socialism the politics of the society intermesh with the societal structure and social
change. The state-capitalist and totalitarian approaches clearly emphasize the role of a
ruling class and ruling elite respectively. But the former does not satisfactorily define
the nature of the ruling class and the latter does not explain the values and motivations
of the rules. Both these theories exaggerate the role of violence and neglect consensus.
The industrial society theory brings out the ways in which a common technology
influences social institutions such as the educational system; but it lacks a social or
class dynamic and glosses over the fact that property classes characterizing capitalist
society have no counterpart in state-socialist society. The worker's state theory gives
prominence to the class nature of Soviet society and brings out the role of values in
economic change and social development. Whilst recent thinkers, such as Mandel have
recognized the role of culture and of historical experience, a sociology of state-socialist
society has not been attempted; the nature of consensus under state socialism is little
explored and too many ills of the system are attributed to bureaucracy (Lane, 1976; 63).8
nomics of shortage (Kornai, 1981), political economy of socialism (Kor-
nai, 1992), on the investment cycles in socialism (Bauer, 1988) on the role
of the money, planning and market in socialist systems (Soós, 1987). These
theories neglect the impact of politics on the redistribution and accumula-
tion, and its influence on the reproduction of shortage, or on the invest-
ment or planning cycles.
Deep-drilling empirical field studies were born on several dimensions
and segments of the system, seeking its political, institutional, economic
and developmental aspects, from different approaches: political science,
history, sociology, anthropology and economy. There were works that fo-
cused on political issues: the central and local party and state elite, the no-
menklatura. Others analyzed institutional aspects: central and local gov-
ernments, planning, bureaucratic procedures, regulations and bargaining
processes. Economic aspects were also addressed: the distribution of re-
sources, partial markets (e.g. workforce, second economy), territorial dif-
ferences, enterprise behavior. Also developmental aspects were analyzed:
investment cycles, reforms, revolution, collapses and transformations.
These studies however, were obviously not addressing the operation and
change of the party-state system as a whole.
The sweeping collapse and post-collapse developments of the party-
states in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe inspired both former field stu-
dents and comparative scientists to compare the differences between their
subject and Soviet and East-European events. A huge "transitology" litera-
ture boosted up to analyze and explain the differences in the collapse and
post-collapse development of the former party-states. Another field has
flourished when theorists dealing with developing countries begun to com-
pare the Latin-American and Southern European transitions from authori-
tarian to democratic rule to the post-collapse transformation of the former
party-states (for an analytical overview of these comparative efforts see
Bunce, 2000). These literatures did not take into consideration the specific
determinant features of party-state structures compared to authoritarian
rules in general. They could not explain, why some party-states collapse
and others don't. Could not convincingly explain why the political order
and social development after the collapse is so divergent in the post-
socialist transformations. They could not reveal the structural reasons for
the existence of reforming and non-reforming party states, neither the col-
lapse of both despite different strategies. We do not get answer either to
the reasons why reforming party-states have taken different development
paths after the collapse.9
Several theories evolved also upon the puzzle of the dramatically
different development process of the Chinese and East Asian economy
compared to that of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They attempted to
explain the dramatically different developmental trajectories of the Chinese
and East Asian economies as against those of the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe (see for example: Jin and Haynes, 1997; Tong, 1997; Lin and al.,
1995; Halpern, 1989; Montinola, and al., 1995; Naughton, 1996; McMillan
and Naughton, 1992; Qian and Xu, 1993; Solnik, 1996; Wu, Y. Sh., 1994;
Walder, 1995; Gelb and Jefferson, 1993; McKinnon, 1993; Wing Thye Woo,
1994). The questions were, and still are the following: why some economies
collapse while others remain cohesive, and why reforms are successful in
some party-states and not in others.
Interpretations that have been offered are wide-ranging, and the
arguments are complex. Yet, they can be grouped along specific dimensions.
First, there are arguments that draw upon the specifics of the countries
involved – for example, variations in culture, geopolitical location, the state
of development of the society in which socialism was founded, and the
actual size of the countries in question. Secondly, there are temporal
arguments – for instance, differences in historical context when the party-
state was formed, differences in the stage of development of the specific
party-state when it started to move away from state socialism, the prevailing
international context, and world historical timing (or differences in the
window of opportunity for the transformation). The third group of
arguments is based on institutional differences. This involves differences in
the institutional structure, the level of institutionalization, the level of
decentralization of decision-making, and even differences in the character of
political power during the transformation. The fourth set of arguments is
more dynamic in nature. These include conscious strategic choices made by
the elite and counter-elite, incremental versus radical reforms, the origin of
reforms (from below or from above), the sequencing of political
transformation versus economic transformation, and so forth. These four
types of arguments have appeared in the literature in various combinations.
Whatever the approaches taken, they all aim at explaining the successful
growth attributed to the Chinese style economic reforms versus the
recession, collapse and hardships characteristic of the Soviet and Eastern
European "failed" reforms. But these reforms are and were in subject and
aim very similar. Why then, the different outcomes? Does the response lie
indeed in technical issues such as timing, sequencing, and effective
enforcement? Is it a question of apt reformers versus those constrained by10
domestic and/or external forces? Is it the different reaction of the society to
reforms that matter?
In this work I define the grounds of an institutional model of party-
state system as such, and reveal the political-economic-social logic of
its reproduction and change. My goal is to grasp the system's main
building blocks, and the interaction of these building blocks during
reproduction. I will point to the structural motivations during interaction
and the structural inequalities driving to differences in bargaining
capacities during the reproduction process. From this point of view, the
analysis reevaluates the general concept of soft budget constraints and
locates its role and impact in the reproduction process. It aims to shed light
on the structural background of the differences among party-states and the
impact of those differences on the reproduction and the transformation of
these systems. It makes effort to bridge over the different aspects and
approaches and combine theory with empirical knowledge to become
comprehensive. It worries about institutional details, linkages between
people and positions, the production and flow of resources, the rules that
govern relationships, interactions, interests and behavior, the missions of
institutions and their relationship to policies, the boundaries of the
structure, the tie between that structure and its operation and the pressures
to reproduce. It traces the political-economic and structural logic of the
implementation of different instruments for reproduction. Reveals the
consequences of the mutual impact of instruments and structural specifics
on the reproduction and transformation process. This way it makes an
effort to embrace structure and dynamics of party states – both common
traits and the differences – in time, in space in the level of aggregation and
in the state of condition of the system.11
A. THE INTERACTIVE PARTY-STATE (IPS) MODEL
The IPS model was developed upon empirical data provided by the
development of the Hungarian party-state and it was extended to the East
European systems, utilizing empirical and theoretical literature. The basic
ideas of the model were inspired by twenty years of empirical research on
the Hungarian party-state. Survey of data, documents, case studies, archives
and more than 400 interviews performed with representatives of the
Hungarian state- and party bureaucracy and with enterprise managers
provided a unique opportunity at that time to learn on the spot. Results upon
research were born on the structure, the operation, the disintegration and the
collapse of the Hungarian party-state (Csanádi, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992).
The dynamics of the impact of party-states on the transformation was also
analyzed. Theoretical results were extended to the structure and operation of
the Soviet- and East-European party-states and thereby developed into a
party-state model (Csanádi, 1997). This "manoeuvre" was made possible by
abundant and excellent secondary sources (Bunce,  1983,  1985,  1989;
Wolchik,  1988,  1990; Comisso, 1988; Fainsod, 1958; Brown, 1992,
Grossman, 1983, Hough, 1969, Hough and Fainsod, 1979, Pacepa, 1989,
Shapiro, 1970, Tarkowski, 1990, Voslenski, 1984, Zemtsov, 1985). These
studies analyzed the then Eastern Bloc and its individual countries from
different perspectives, at different levels and periods. Thus, the theory
evolved into a dynamic model, which postulated a self-similar character for
the structure and operation of party-states in different dimensions and
explained the structural reasons for the differences among them (Csanádi,
1997). These theoretical assumptions were later empirically backed by
several comparative studies on the evolution, collapse and transformation of
the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
(Blagojevic, 1999; Bunce, 1999;  Solnik, 1996; Wu Yu-Shan, 1994).
The main idea of the model is based on simple empirical evidences:
relationship between party, state and economic decision-making is very
close. This close relationship has its institutional background: party-, and
state hierarchy and state owned economy is interconnected through the
power instruments of the party. These instruments (such as nomenklatura
system, subject-matter responsibility, instructor system and party
membership) provide direct connection between party-, state- and
economic decisions. On the one hand these institutional ties allow
influencing and controlling non-party positional-, activity-, organizational-
, structure and individual behavior in non-party fields. On the other hand
the very same instruments forge the channels for interest promotion of12
decision-makers embraced by these instruments. Interlocked structure
evolving from these relationships reveals in-built inequalities of interest
promotion. Bargaining capacities of those who match political priorities of
the party are stronger than that of those who don't. Actors with different
bargaining capacities form the party-state power structure. This party-state
structure (network) is no empty skeleton. It is filled with activity of varying
intensity and held together by the interests, motivations, appropriate
behavior and communication of its actors. The dynamics, due to the
distinctive nature of its internal connections, can be defined by characteristic
principles. The consequences of these principles are: the politically
monopolized dependence of decision-makers, politically monopolized
distribution of resources and the politically monopolized interest
promotion.  Direct links of party- and economic decision-makers
through the party's instruments of power and via those, the politically
monopolized dependencies, interest promotion and resource
distribution will induce politically rational motivations and behavior
for economic ends. Until the principles of operation do not change,
political rationality of behavior will prevail within the reaches of the
net.
In the following pages, the construction of the Interactive Party-State
(IPS) model will be emphasized. In detail, (I) the basic components, (II) the
main connecting principles of these elements, (III) the kind of inter-related
structure it forms, and the inequalities in dependency and interest promotion
built in the structure, (IV) the main principles of operation of this structure,
inducing the dynamics of reproduction.
I. The basic components of the IPS model
Party-states are in general regarded as hierarchical structures
3. It is evident,
that both the structure of the Party apparatus, the State apparatus has a
hierarchical shape. But is that also so obvious that the structure formed by
their interplay follows the rules of a hierarchy? Let us now turn to the
                                                
3 "In the case of highly centralized jurisdiction, the principle of hierarchy indicates that
every problem, assignment, conflict, indeed every social phenomenon requiring a
decision becomes incorporated into a hierarchical chain of activity. On its way upwards,
it needs to pass through well-defined stages until a decision is taken. In the opposite
direction this decision then passes through the same vertical institutional chain (which
was formerly used to transmit information upwards) to reach the bottom where the given
problem originated" (Bihari, 1985; 115).13
detailed description of the main components of the party-state structure
based on some simple statements. These simple statements though will
induce an extremely subtle structure.
Key:
S State (non-party) hierarchy
P Party hierarchy
An Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level of the structure
D1 Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence
I1 Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion
Figure  1  The formal hierarchies and the possible course of interest
promotion along the intra-hierarchy (D1) thread from the
perspective of decision-makers (actors, An) at various levels of
the structure.
(i)  The party hierarchy (P), with hierarchical dependency lines (D1) and
direct interest promotion (I1) through these same lines (Figure 1.)
(ii)  The state hierarchy (S) with hierarchical dependency lines (D1) and
direct interest promotion (I1) through these same lines (Figure 1.)
(iii)  State-monopolized ownership, and resources (Figure 1)
(iv)  Dependency lines inter-linking party and state hierarchy. These inter-
linking lines are formed by the instruments of party power and
embrace individual decision-makers. Interlinking lines originate from
the party hierarchy and break through non-party institutional
boundaries and reach out to individual decision-makers (D2) (Figure
2). The most important of these instruments are: the nomenklatura14
system that reaches individuals in non-party and party organizations
though their position, the instructor system reaching individuals
through party organizations within non-party organizations, the
subject-matter responsibility tracking the fulfillment of party priorities
through the non-party organization's activity, and through the party
discipline required from individual party members
4.
Key:
S State (non-party) hierarchy
P Party hierarchy
An Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level of the structure
D1 Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence
D2 Direction of cross-hierarchy dependence
I1 Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion
I2 Path of cross-hierarchy interest promotion
Figure 2 The basic network and possible paths of interest promotion
along intra-hierarchy and cross-hierarchy threads (D1 and D2)
from the perspective of decision-makers (actors, An) at various
levels of the structure
There are several similar instruments, which vary in kind and
importance according to the given period or given country. For example,
in China the so-called party core groups are strengthening the ties
                                                
4 Type-setting of empirical examples is italic with single line spacing.15
between party and government institutions. Party core groups are
composed of the administrative and political leaders of the institution,
apart from the party committee located in these organizations supervised
by the Organization Departmenst of higher party authorities (Burns,
1994). They form an operative decision-making team. However, the variety
and strength of the interlinking threads do not change the fact of their very
existence.
Using a combination of these instruments, and by reaching individuals,
the party was able to infiltrate the whole of the non-party decision-making
structure. These instruments penetrated the walls of the state hierarchy and
of the economic (and other) institutions monopolized by it. In this way,
individual decision-makers were reached from several directions. These
instruments served for the forwarding or passing on of norms, and were, at
the same time, instruments of control. Simultaneously, these very same
dependency lines serve as channels for interest promotion (I2) outside the
non-party hierarchy towards the party hierarchy in all those directions (and
levels) from which the interlinking lines depart. In consequence of the
direct connection of the party, state and economy through these lines, all
political decisions become directly economic and all economic and
administrative decisions become directly political, causing high political
sensitivity.
(v)   The fifth element of the party-state structure is feedback (Figure 3).
Feedback connection (I3) shortcuts the lines of dependency within and
across party and state hierarchy. These shortcuts provide a direct link
between decision-makers within the basic network that are otherwise
isolated from each other. They are isolated because they happen to be
in different hierarchies, or are at different levels of the same hierarchy.
With the I3 threads, an actor is able to jump any number of levels in his
own hierarchy, and is able to reach any decision-maker on a given
level, indeed, any level of the party hierarchy. With the help of the I3
threads, a feedback loop is formed: one side of it is the I3, the other is
the D1 or D2 threads, or a combination of the two.
For example an enterprise manager may be invited to take part in a
ministerial board session where export strategy is discussed. It also forms
if an enterprise manager is elected for Central Committee. Shortcuts are
forged if the enterprise's economic strategy is discussed at the provincial
Party Committee (PC) where the manager is invited. Similar effect may be
revealed if either a province or county party committee (or government) is
elected to the CC membership or a county party committee, (government)16
into the provincial PC.
Key:
S State (non-party) hierarchy
P Party hierarchy
An Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level of the structure
D1 Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence
D2 Direction of cross-hierarchy dependence
I1 Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion
I2 Path of cross-hierarchy interest promotion
I3 Direction of feedbacks
Figure 3 Structural feedbacks (I1, I2, and I3) in the basic network and
possible paths of interest promotion through intra-hierarchy and
cross-hierarchy feedbacks (utilizing threads D1 and D2) from the
perspective of decision-makers (actors, An) at various levels of the
structure.
These individual feedback connections come into existence where the
decision-maker captured by the dependency threads, within and across
hierarchies, is able to produce a high level of political sensitivity via the
dependency threads. Thus, the feedback is available to those whose activity17
or passivity could – through the interlinking lines – provoke tensions in the
maintenance of the leading role of the party, in national security, in
economic or political stability, or in growth. Those who are capable of being
strategically important could easily cause a bottleneck in domestic supplies,
in production, in exports to the West, in the satisfaction of the so-called
socialist contingencies (state level commercial agreements), in delaying
major investments. They are able credibly to suggest the likelihood of strikes
and the concomitant political consequences. They are also the very same
actors, however, whose assistance helps in the alleviation of these threats,
and in the realization of major goals. These goals represent the basic
political priorities of the party-state system. It is their impact on these
concerns that determines the political bargaining capability of a decision-
maker or organization. Hence, there are selective political criteria for the
emergence of the feedback relationships. With the help of structural
feedback, the decision-makers are able to reach higher echelons of decision-
making and to directly influence those decisions that affected them both
within their own, and the party hierarchies.
We can trace cross-hierarchy shortcuts in China if we take for example
those 170 enterprises whose leader's nomenklatura is under the jurisdiction
of the "Working Party Committee for Large Enterprises" subordinated to the
State Council (interview, 2000). Further shortcuts are provided for the
leaders of those 52 enterprises that are in the nomenklatura of the CC
(Burns, 1988).
In this way, decision-makers become deeply integrated into the
decision-making process with individual interest promoted. Through
these closer personal connections, those who benefit from feedback are able
to give and receive direct information. They can make promises in return for
promised material or non-material pay-off. They are able to make deals,
prepare themselves for the effects of unavoidable decisions, find allies,
detect potential adversaries, and so on.
While the inter-linking threads (which come from as many directions as
possible) embrace the decisions of as many decision-makers as possible,
only a relatively few actors enjoy the system of feedbacks. The number of
feedbacks, therefore, is limited. However, for those individuals that have
acquired political sensitivity, the ability to accumulate feedbacks within this
system of direct connections is practically limitless.
An example for the scarcity of feedbacks is revealed if we take the level of
the Central Committee in Hungary during the 1970s: if we ignore those CC
members who did not have competitive partners within the state structure
with equal rank to be chosen from (for example, the Minister for Internal18
Affairs, Minister of Defence, the President of the Ministerial Council, the
heads of department of the CC apparatus, the CC secretaries, and so on),
then of the 150–170 positions to be filled approximately 50–70 remain. Thus,
only narrow possibilities remain if we consider the 19 counties, the 22
districts, the almost 700 ministry and council and 661 co-operative industrial
enterprises, and the 2,830 non-industrial enterprises including the
agricultural co-operatives (Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS] 1980)
competing to gain feedback. Added to this are all the other state and social
institutions (universities, colleges of advanced education, research
institutions, councils, social bodies, and so on) which, in principle, are also
eligible for these 50-70 positions (Csanádi, 1984; 50).
Thus, new inequalities in bargaining abilities are built into the structure:
there are individuals that have feedback, those that have only the D1 and D2,
or those with only D1, or no institutional connections at all. Structural
feedback represents political bargaining power not just for those that directly
satisfy these criteria, but also for those who are responsible for them through
the D1 and D2 threads.
That was probably one of the reasons why in the 1970s provincial
governments in China fought for the allocation of jurisdiction over more state
owned enterprises thus far subordinated to the central authorities (Sun, 1997;
13). The other reason was to increase local governments' resources. Similar
reasons may be revealed in Hungary, where local party committees fought for
the allocation of the nomenklatura responsibilities of the leaders of more
important state owned enterprises located in their territory 
5.
The party-state, therefore, was burdened from the outset with an
extraordinarily complicated structure of interests and inequality, which
depended upon the degree of political sensitivity the decision-maker was
able to evoke through dependency threads. Because of the great structural
complexity of all these threads, and the lack of transparency of the
procedures transmitted through them, let us call the threads of this structure
as  closed channels (concerning China see Burns,  1987,  1994; Harmin,
1992). The closed channels enmesh every decision-making forum under the
pretext of institutionalized and informal interest mediation, even if this
occurred in an area that belonged exclusively to the competence of a state
body. The sheer size and lack of transparency of the structure strengthens
even further the structural atomization of those actors already tied
individually to the interlinking threads: unknown and indiscernible forces lie
                                                
   5 For more details on Hungarian story see Csanádi  (1987a; 1987b);  Kovács (1980);
Lamberger (1988); Szalai (1988); and Tellér (1984–1985; 1987).19
behind and face each actor. This changeable and indeterminate power will
be called the phantom force. Because of the existence of the closed channels
and the phantom force, decision-makers are unable with any certainty to
judge either their own strength or that of their allies or, indeed, the real
power of their opponents. Because of phantom force, therefore, the
bargaining positions and bargaining capacities of each actor in relation to all
the others are always uncertain. Despite the dependence and the unequal
capacities for interest promotion within the whole system, this uncertainty
demands of every single decision-maker constant vigilance, activity, and
adaptability. Even if this position proves relatively stable, each actor has to
struggle constantly to keep it so. Therefore, they are compelled to take good
care of existing connections and strive to create new ones. This is a matter of
insurance in such an uncertain world.
The content of the phantom force in any given decision-making situation
depends on a number of things: the individual decision-maker's feedback
loops that are active at any given moment; the current number of allies, the
density and quality of their feedback connections and the level of their
accumulation; and, finally the mystified nature of the structures themselves.
The phantom force of an actor or an institution behind the actor is always as
large as its environment is willing – or is forced – to believe.
A characteristic of this net is that  the advantages accentuating the
utilization of personal connections are guaranteed not by the individual’s
shrewdness but by the very nature of the structure. Thus, the abuse of the
system does not stem from breaking its rules, but from utilizing them. The
possibility for corruption is structurally given.
Taken together, these elements form the power structures of party-states
(Figure 4). They define the channels, and thus, the network for promoting
and enforcing interest. In other words: they form the network of
interdependent relationships between party, state and economic decision-
making. The net also reveals the politically rational nature of the
structurally built-in inequalities and dependencies within the system's
politically rational selection criteria. These criteria define the politically
rational nature of built-in differences in bargaining positions over
resources where equally ranked decision-makers in formal terms are
involved.20
Key:
S State (non-party) hierarchy
P Party hierarchy
An Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level of the structure
D1 Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence
D2 Direction of cross-hierarchy dependence
I1 Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion
I2 Path of cross-hierarchy interest promotion
I3 Direction of feedbacks
Figure 4 Power structure of the party-state system and the perspective of
decision makers (actors, An ) on various levels on the possible
paths of interest promotion (from 'a' to 'i'.)
II. The principles of connection within the IPS model
Despite indiscernible boundaries, the structure is built on two simple
principles of connection of the elements described above:21
(i) The interlinking dependency threads D2, as the instruments of Party
power may originate only at the different levels of the Party hierarchy
(ii) The feed backs between the Party and State hierarchies (cross-hierarchy
feedbacks) may originate only within the non-party institutions. They
reach out to different levels of the party hierarchy and then, by utilizing the
interlinking dependency threads D2 end up in non-party institutions.
III. The party-state structure
Having described the main elements and main connecting principles of the
party-state structure, let us now summarize in Table 1 the main layers of the
party-state (see Figures 1, 2, and 3.). This allows us to shed light on the
basic differences between the structural features of a hierarchy, the basic
network, and finally, the main structural features of party-states. The final
net explains how the properties of a hierarchical structure
6 are overcome and
the hierarchy blurred (also in Figure 4). The main characteristics of this
structure demonstrate the institutional background of blurred
boundaries between state and party, politics and economics, power and
society etc. (Csanádi, 1997).
The distinctiveness of a party-state structure evolves through the direct
connection between party and state, politics and economy
7 via the
interlinking lines, the political nature of built-in inequalities and political
integration via feedbacks and the principles on which these connections are
based. These characteristics furnish the unique institutional interactivity
of politics and other spheres at the level of individual decision-making.
                                                
6 Within formal hierarchies the actors on any one level enjoy identical rank. At any
given level, all actors are dependent to the same extent on all higher levels actors,
and they exercise power to the same extent over all levels below them. D1 lines,
representing the dependency threads, are the sole channels of interest promotion (I1)
in a hierarchy.
7 The same direct connection is true for other sub-spheres and levels of the society:
culture, politics, education, healthcare, civil society, social movements, mass
movements, executive legal and judicial decisions, procurator, police apparatus, etc.
These sub-spheres in the circumstances of monopolized property relationships, for
the sake of simplicity, are "condensed" in the concept of non-party – state –
hierarchy.22
Table 1 The formal hierarchy, the basic network, and the party-state
structure
The formal hierarchy
(Elements: D1 and the state
monopolized economy)
The basic network (Elements: D1, D2,
and the politically mono-polized
economy both directly through D2 and
indirectly through D2 by connecting D1
in state hierarchy)
The party-state structure
(Elements: D1, D2, I3, and the
politically monopolized
economy through D1 and D2)
Its peak is recognizable both
within the party- and within
the state hierarchy
The interwoven structure has one peak
(the party) and one base (those who are
not members of the party)
Only the base is discernible: those
who are not linked to the struc-
ture with any insti-tutionalized
threads at all. The peak is
discernible only with difficulty
Connections are between and
within institutions
The connections both within and
between institutions are formed
between individuals
Connections both within and
between institutions come about
between individuals
Dependency is direct: interest
promotion I1 can only come
about through hierarchical
dependency lines D1
Dependency is direct: interest
promotion within I1 and across I2
hierarchy can only take place through
D1 and D2, respectively
Dependency is two-folded: 1.
direct - I1 and I2 can only come
about through D1 and D2,
respectively; 2. is also indirect,
since I3 can occur by using up D1
and/or D2 as one part of the
feedback loop
Dependency is unidirectional:
the origin and direction of the
depen-dencies is not reversible
(thus power is monopolized
within the structure)
Dependency is uni-directional: the
direction of dependence is not
reversible (politically monopolized
power)
Dependency is unidirec-tional :
the direction of dependence is
not rever-sible (politically mono-
polized power)
Decision-makers with the
same rank are on the same
level (here rank is identical
with bargaining position)
The bargaining positions of equally-
ranked decision-makers on the various
levels of the formal hierarchy are
different
The bargaining positions of the
otherwise formally equally-
ranked decision-makers on the
various levels of the formal
hierarchy are different
Dependency is single-threa-
ded: in the process of interest
promotion the decision-maker
is unable to bypass the level
immediately above him
Dependency is multi-threaded: within the
formal state hierarchy, the direct superior
is bypassable in interest promotion with
the help of D2, but not the party res-
ponsible holding the end of D2
Dependency is multi-threaded:
D1 is bypassable through D2 with
the help of I2; with the help of I3
D1 thread and/or D2 is
bypassable
The single-threaded depen-
dency (D1) and interest pro-
motion (I1) affects every ac-
tor who has institutional ties.
The multi-thread affects only those
decision-makers to whom at least one
D2-type thread leads (indirect
feedback)
I2 and I3 are the privilege of only
those decision-makers that
satisfy the system's selectivity
criteria
Remarks: D1 is the intra-hierarchy dependency thread; D2 is the dependency thread which
originates in the party and links the two hierarchies; I1 is the intra-hierarchy interest
promotion thread through D1; I2 is the inter-hierarchy interest promotion thread through
D2; I3 thread represents the structural feedbacks within the basic network (within and
across hierarchies, being the origin of this latter always in non-party hierarchy and its
target in party hierarchy)23
IV. The main principles of operation of the IPS model
What kind of operation this interlocked structure will induce? Are there any
regularities to it? The dynamics of the party-state structure, due to the
distinctive nature of its internal connections, can be defined by characteristic
principles. The principles of its operation,  just as its basic elements and
principles of connection are rather simple:
(i)  While all decision-makers have D1 threads of control, only the party's
decision-makers can have D2 threads that link through them all the
others within the structure. Therefore, dependencies are politically
monopolized.
(ii)  Through the state monopoly over the ownership of the means of
production, and through the threads of control binding the state to the
party hierarchy (D2), property rights and extraction and distribution of
resources become politically monopolized
8.
                                                
8 Distribution and extraction of resources does not mean only budgetary action. It means
actions that directly or indirectly provide financial resources. E.g. In China these
were the following at different periods, allocated to different levels of aggregation:
the selective distribution of investment quotas, investment flows from central
authorities by attracting central projects (allocation of central investment funds by
being linked to a larger, centrally planned long-term development program), selective
distribution of foreign currency; profit retention deals; project approval; province
revenue sharing; selective depreciation fund centralization; tax incentives; tariff
reductions; licensing priorities; raw material and capital goods import duty
privileges; distribution of scarce resources Category I, II, freedom from export duties;
diminishing bureaucracy; allowing for reform experiment; foreign exchange retention
rate; export subsidies; listed separate line item in the state plan (meaning the set of
economic powers equal to that of provinces); right to approve overseas investment
over a certain amount of dollars; permission to issue state bonds; disposal of funds
appropriated from the state and the central bank, without approval from the province;
power to grant loans to city firms without reporting or seeking approval; acquiring
own planning quotas directly from the central government, without having to go
through the province; decentralizing SOEs providing further local taxes; set prices;
distribution of raw materials (electrical power, iron); getting lowered tax rates;
authorization to issue securities; authorization to utilize foreign exchange; liquid
asset loans; authorization to directing FDI; being selected to become a high-tech (or
else) industrial development zone; allowing the settlement of foreign funded
enterprises; visit of higher party and government personnel; imposing extra levies
and taxes; middle- and long-term loans; be part of preferential policies; repre-
sentation in central political and government bodies; representation in provincial
bodies; credit relief for those indebted; those exempted during austerity programs;
exemption of profit adjustment tax introduced in the second half of 1984 (intended to
siphon off excessive "policy" profits not due to efficiency) etc.24
(iii)  Since there is no other way to enforce interests within this system
except through the direct or indirect utilization of the D1 and D2
dependency threads, interest promotion possibilities are also
politically monopolized.
As a consequence of these structural characteristics, in the
politically monopolized structure, all political decisions will have both
economic and administrative consequences, and all economic and
administrative decisions will have a political resonance. Not only the
structure but the principles of operation reveal the interactive character
of the model. This also defines the institutional background of politically
monopolized dependencies, distribution and interest promotion and,
thus, the framework of structural motivations defining behavior.
V. Structural motivators in the dynamics of reproduction inducing
political rationality of behavior
What are the structural motivators that afford the dynamics of the structure,
filling it with activity? Let us see first see, how the interactive structure
determines the position of decision-makers.
All decision-makers within this structure with access to dependency
threads find themselves in a dual situation: they are at once controllers and
captives of the dependency threads. This dual situation is characteristic of
any hierarchy. What is specific to this structure are the politically
monopolized activity, organization and positional structure and the
politically monopolized properties through the state monopoly and
interlinking (D2) lines. All these will determine the incentives, motives and
                                                                                                                                              
In Hungary after 1968 resources meant for example the subsidies given to priority
production, or to compensate losses; there were differentiated production taxes
imposed over revenues judged non-deserved. Fixed, constrained and free prices,
medium- and long-term credits, scarce manpower were allocated to certain
enterprises and growth was selectively allowed by ranking enterprises into a, b, c
categories: to be reduced or shut down, to be kept on the same level and to be
developed. Territories were also ranked into different development categories. All
these meant direct or indirect access to financial resources. It had similar
consequences when some of the enterprises were selected as key enterprises of long-
term technical development programs, or as ones contributing to the long-term
national economic plans by submitting their own. Enterprises were also being pointed
out as those allowed to directly purchasing raw materials and spare-parts from the
producer, avoiding wholesalers. Some enterprises were allowed to merge other
enterprises, or to import scarce goods from abroad etc.25
dynamics within party-states. The duality of this situation produces within
decision-makers an extraordinarily complex set of motives and pressures
which function as the structural motivators of behavior.
Within this politically monopolized power structure, decision-makers, as
controllers of the dependency threads, are both able and compelled to
intervene anywhere within the structure. They are able not only to
monopolize priorities in the exploitation of resources, but also to determine
priorities in the distribution of resources and privileges. Indeed, they are by
principle able to intervene anywhere within the system in the name of
"general" (monopolized) responsibility. At the same time, however,
decision-makers are compelled to intervene because of the constant pressure
from those who can only realize their interests through the dependency
threads. The pressure to intervene is enhanced by the political sensitivity
through interlinking lines. Intervention reflects political concerns and
expectations over economic activity.
For example, it is the party and state organizations that are responsible
for the efficiency of economic activity. They expect a political struggle to
check the growth in state subsidies. The formulation of long-term perspectives
within enterprises is perceived to be a function of political agitation.
Combating short-term perspectives is perceived to depend upon personal
integrity, upon communist consciousness and class struggle, and requires
from the individual a revolutionary stance towards his own organization
(enterprise). The selection of products according to their usefulness depends
upon the supervising organizations.
In order to satisfy the constant pressure exerted upon them to redistribute
resources and in order to acquire resources to redistribute, decision-makers
(as controllers of the dependency threads) are forced constantly to intervene
and to siphon-away resources; this, on the other hand, motivates the
decision-makers (as captives of the dependency threads) again to utilize
these threads as "pleaders"
9, and so continue the above described process.
The ability and the compulsion to intervene through the dependency
threads ensure constant possibilities and reasons for continuous and
politically based acts of intervention. The party-state structure behind the
possibility and interest to intervene makes it possible to carry out
interventions of any extremity. It will be capable of altering activities and
priorities, of restructuring organizations, of increasing forced social mobility
or constraining it, of carrying out purges at any level, of transferring capital,
manpower, or even. The extent to which these possibilities were applied in
                                                
9 As intervention covers extraction and reallocation of resources, pleading covers the
interest promotion both for allocation and for exemptions of extraction.26
practice varied according to the power relations at that specific point in time
(see the difference for example between Hungary in the first half of the
1950s and after the 1968 reform, or China during the Cultural Revolution or
after 1994).
The constant scramble for resources forces actors to strive continually to
exploit resources and to promote the practice of selective allocation of
resources. What would happen if they were not to intervene? In a politically
monopolized system, they would be abandoning those who turn to them as
the only source of help, for in this system there are no other avenues for
interest promotion. To be abandoned in this politically monopolized system
does not lead to enhanced autonomy, but to greater dependence upon and
exploitation by the remaining dependency threads. Furthermore, there would
be a reallocation of power to the benefit of those who have continued to
control the threads to the disadvantage of those who have broken them. In
other words, the power-holders would voluntarily surrender their own
positions of power.
Here is an example that illustrates the shift in power relations. In 1981 three
branch (line) ministries were merged into one Ministry of Industry, deprived
from intervention rights and pressured for not promoting the interest of
enterprises subordinated to it. Its task became the to promote long-term
industrial policy: "...but the enterprises eventually discovered that a very large
proportion of matters depend on functional ministries, i.e. on state institutions
whose organizations (either through the instructor system or subject-matter
responsibility – M.Cs.), belong to us. Thus, if they want to achieve something at
the National Bank, the Price Office, the Ministry for Foreign Trade, they often
come here" (CC Department of Economic Policy, 1984).
On the other hand, decision-makers as captives of the structure's
dependency threads, decision-makers are at once exploited by, and have an
interest in the continued existence of the dependency threads. Decision-
makers are exploited because the political expectations relayed through the
dependency threads, in all sorts of ways, limit their room for manoeuvre. At
the same time, decision-makers have an interest in maintaining these
dependency threads: within the politically monopolized system there is no
other avenue for interest promotion. Decision-makers are interested in
utilizing the dependency threads in order to obtain resources and
concessions–precisely these lines that guarantee their opportunity to bargain
and increase their room for manoeuvre. In order to be able to utilize these
dependency threads, actors have to adapt to the expectations relayed to them
through these threads. The simultaneous presence of dependence and27
interest explains why decision-makers in the given structure adapt to the
requirements of forwarded political rationality.
In this process, it is not mere coercion but the decision-makers' own
well-considered interests as "pleaders" that force them to satisfy the
expectations of their superiors, to accept the prevailing power structure,
indeed, to consider the dependency threads indispensable. However, what
would happen if they behaved in a different way? Decision-makers, as
captives of the dependency threads, would voluntarily give up their
bargaining opportunities. In other words, they would give up the avenues
through which they obtain information and promote their interests. They
would jeopardize the future of their organization, activity and their own
careers. Therefore, their economic behavior as "pleaders" is also politically
rational.
In sum, structural motivators, that is, the ability and compulsion, the
dependency and interests strongly tied to each other, guarantee within the
whole structure a politically rational behavior pattern on the part of the
decision-makers. These also represent the driving force for the functioning
of the structure and, through this, the cohesive power of the politically
monopolized system.
Feedbacks do not alter, but improve the efficiency of the system's
functioning. There are two reasons for this. First, they multiply the chances
of decision-makers to influence decisions that affect them by encountering
decision makers on other levels and hierarchies whom otherwise they would
never meet. Secondly, the feedbacks make it possible directly to take into
account and supervise interests of key importance to the political power
structure and thus shorten the reaction time to decisions. Because of that,
feed-backs institutionalize the selective distribution and the political
rationality of the selective distribution as well as the enhanced
bargaining capacity of those having strategic resources.
Through the motivating effect of the structural background, decision-
makers, in order to obtain a more advantageous bargaining position as
"pleaders", try to establish feedback with as many places as possible.
Through accumulating feedbacks, the interests of the very same actors are
projected from several directions, giving the impression of a multitude of
similar interests and this increases the size of these actors' phantom force
and pressuring capacity. To enable them to do this, they must be capable of
generating a high level of political sensitivity. This requires accumulating
weight, which leads to the drive for resources. This drive leads to requests
for support through the dependency threads and this, in turn, forces them to28
meet the expectations relayed to them. Meeting the expectations at the same
time signals acceptance of the power exercised over them.
It is clear, therefore, that it is the system itself that creates those
conditions – the structural motivators – that inspire the decision-makers to
intervene, to select, to apply for resources, and to adapt. Under conditions of
political monopoly, these behavior-patterns are politically rational. Also
the recurring political concerns leading to specific selectivity in the
distribution of resources and favors, along with the effort to satisfy
expectations, have a structural background. Therefore, these behavior-
patterns are not based upon subjective motivators
10 that are independent of
the structural background. It is precisely the structural motivators that bring
them into existence. In other words, political rationality is the
characteristic behavior in the confines of the net induced by the
structural motivators stemming from the principles of operation.
Political rationality is therefore, system-conforming. The infrastructure for
this behavior-pattern is afforded by the basic network, the feedback
mechanism, and the political monopolization of the structure.
VI. Selectively soft budget constraints in the self-supporting process
The basic principles of the functioning of the system and the structural
motivators stemming from them, together with the constant efforts based on
political rationality create a system-conforming self-supporting process
within the politically monopolized system. What kind of characteristics is
given to the process of reproduction if political rationality of behavior is the
characteristic structural behavior?
According to the properties of the IPS model, it is a consequence of the
basic principles of the system's functioning that, within the self-supporting
mechanism, there are no economic efficiency constraints on the siphoning-
away of resources. Therefore, nor are there such constraints on their
politically based selective redistribution. Neither is there an economic
efficiency constraint upon the interest and behavior-patterns associated
with the extraction and redistribution of resources and the adaptation to
these criteria. All in all, there are no efficiency considerations in the self-
supporting process.
                                                
 10 This is the reason why I do not agree with Kornai's argument in The Economics of
Shortage, concerning the "natural instincts" of the enterprise manager to strive for
growth as explanation of the scramble for growth. (See Kornai, 1980; 78, 204–206.)29
This statement, despite its similar conclusion, challanges Kornai's
general statement of soft budget constraint. Kornai maintains that "...the
key question is not what motive excites the scramble for quantity..., the
compulsion to expand. The main problem is the following: Is there a force
which acts in the opposite direction which would lead to the leaders of
production voluntarily holding back their demand for inputs..." (free
translation from Kornai, 1980; 79). His answer is also that there is no such
force. But, according to Kornai, the reason for the absence of this force is
that enterprise leaders are not constrained by efficiency considerations,
since enterprise budget constraints in socialism are soft (p. 330). In this
way they can indulge the inherent desire for growth, which the presence of
shortage and central redistribution – and consequently the pressure arising
from the demand for their products – will reinforce
11.
How can we define the structural background of the reasons why a
withholding force is lacking in the reproduction process? The state's
monopoly over the economy, the structuralization caused by the inter-
linking threads and that of the feedbacks develop on the basis of political
rationality. It is political rationality again that causes the divergence between
the position occupied by decision-makers within the formal hierarchies and
the real strength of their bargaining position. Political considerations seem
to play the most important role also in the chances of obtaining politically
monopolized resources
12.  Thus,  selectivity based on political concerns
determines extraction and redistribution along bargaining capacity that
causes selectively soft budget constraints of those privileged
13.
Let us just recall what Kornai states about the conditions and
consequences of soft budget constraint: The budget constraint is soft when
the long-term survival of an economic unit is ensured even when there is a
sustained deficit. (Kornai, 1980; 123.). Budget constraints in traditional and
                                                
11 What provides the constraints in resource attraction and extraction will be described
after some other characteristics of the net are discussed.
12 Political considerations partially match those which Kornai cites as "deeper and more
general" motifs of allocation (Kornai,  1980; 332–333.). These are: the drive for
stability, the purpose of leveling incomes, the strengthening of the social role and
weight of authorities that perform the redistribution.
13 This statement is demonstrated empirically, concerning budgetary connections in
Hungary (levies and subsidies). Analyzing the differences among large, medium and
small enterprise's relative incomes after budgetary actions compared to the average of
relative incomes will return to almost the same dispersion after budgetary actions
took place. Therefore, budgetary actions had two functions (1) with the imposition of
relatively high levies, to ensure enterprises to rely on distributive power (2) to reward
the neady and /or deserving enterprises with a differentiated distribution of subsidies
(Csanadi, 1997;. 112.).30
reforming party-states are sufficiently soft (p. 330). Most enterprises dictate
prices (mostly output prices) instead of accepting them. The price is not an
exogenous factor for most of them. Even if prices are determined centrally,
the authorities are strongly influenced by enterprises. The tax system is soft:
the enterprise influences the construction of tax regulations, it may attain an
individual exemption, or a moratorium, the tax is not collected
systematically. There are non-repayable state assignments to investments,
or subsidies either to compensate long-term inefficiencies or ad-hoc losses,
or to provide ad-hoc incentives. The credit system is soft: it does observe
orthodox conservative principles. The enterprise gets credit even if there is
no effective guarantee that it can meet a repayment deadline from its
incomes. Loans are not strictly connected to the production and sales
capacity of the enterprise. Irregular repayments of due credit installments are
tolerated.
Consequently, survival is not strictly dependent on the favorable ratio of
sales to expenses. Even if expenses are persistently greater than returns, this
is not a question of life or death. The technical development and growth of
an enterprise will not exclusively depend on its internal resource
accumulating capacity. The enterprise is not forced to adapt to price
circumstances, since it is overwhelmingly price determinant in output.
Therefore, it is not interested in adapting to input prices, or it may also
become loss making, while expecting to be compensated somehow by the
authorities instead of being closed down. Risks are shared with the state: if
the enterprise’s circumstances improve, its extra revenues will be partly
siphoned away but if they deteriorate, the subsequent burdens are in all
likelihood transferred to the state, to the purchaser or the creditor. The
uncertainties are twofold: first, the uncertainty in prices and in purchasing
and selling conditions; secondly, the uncertainty caused by the persistent
redistribution of the enterprises' revenue. The enterprise cannot exactly
foresee how much the state will extract and later redistribute. These
consequences together will lead to an unconstrained search for inputs, since
inputs may be purchased both from internal and external resources. In sum,
the soft budget constraint does not bind the activity of the enterprise in the
real sphere, in production or in purchasing or selling. The soft budget – as
opposed to the hard one – will not be able to exert effective constraint.
Enterprise behavior will be influenced by the anticipation of soft budget
constraint. The extent of constraints is not uniform. Anticipation may
diverge within the same system according to long-term experiences. The
more it anticipates that its survival and growth depends exclusively on the
amount of its expenses covered by sales revenues, the more it will respect31
budget constraints, and the harder the constraint may be (Kornai,  1980;
322–327.).
It is easy to shed light on the structural background of the soft-budget
criteria cited above: the capabilities to influence decisions and attract
resources, the possibilities to be bailed out and to decrease uncertainty,
survival unconstrained by market needs, efficiency and repayable loans, and
consequently, the expectations for soft budget constraints. The chances for
achieving those criteria and acquiring those capabilities will be higher for
those economic actors who have feedbacks. The more feedbacks
accumulated, the less they will have to respect budget constraints,
consequently the higher will be their expectations of soft budget constraint.
With the IPS model – based on structural characteristics and the
principles of operation stemming from these – we can argue that it is not
the  soft budget constraint of enterprises  in general that is the
characteristic feature of party-state systems, rather, its selective
incidence based on politically rational criteria.
Accordingly, the uneven oportunity for soft budget constraint reveals
simultaneously those in the given structure who, by lacking the properties
that match the criteria of selective allocation, are deprived of the privilege
of soft budget constraint. Thus, considered from the point of view of
allocation, selectively soft and hard budget constraints are complementary.
Therefore, "allocation" of hard budget constrain is also selective. The
pattern of those with selectively sof/hard budget constraints – just as the
pattern of selective redistribution – will also reflect power relations
(Csanádi,  1997). In the context of the IPS model, different extent of
bargaining capacity is strictly connected with political power.
Consequently, the pattern of distribution of bargaining capacity reflects
the pattern of the distribution of power.
Table 2. provides a hint about the politically rational criteria of selective
redistribution of privileges
14 and the characteristics of those privileged and
those unprivileged. The criteria were: (i) those large, medium and small
enterprises (I., II., III. respectively); (ii) enterprise managers having or not
having elected party position at any level of the Party's decision-making
                                                
14 Privileges that were taken into consideration during the period between 1970 and
1979 in the machine industry. These were the following: subsidies, medium- and
long-term loans, key enterprises of long-term technical development programs, those
selected out for closer statistical monitoring by the central authorities, those able to
take over other enterprises, those purchasing raw materials directly from producers
(thereby avoiding whole-sale), those selected to contribute with their own pre-plans
to national level middle- and long-term plan.32
hierarchy (P+ if had, P- if did not have that position); (iii) being the largest
enterprise on the territory where the center of the enterprise is located (R+ if
it was the largest, R- if it was not).
Table 2 Chances of being selected and differences in bargaining
capacity between enterprise groups with different characteristics
in the machine industry, between 1970–1979 (per cent)
Size-groups P+R+ P+R- P-R+ P-R- P+ R+ R- P- Total
I. 90,5 74,3 64,3 40,8 84,0 85,0 54,8 46,0 68,1
II. 42,9 36,3 36,3 27,7 43,5 38,1 30,4 28,9 31,6
III. – – – 1,4 – 0,0 1,4 1,4 1,4
Total 78,6 36,4 36,4 8,6 65,0 57,5 11,6 10,0 15,6
Number of
enterprises
20 20 20 386 47 40 413 406 453
The numbers in the table reflect bargaining capacity by pointing to the
ratio between received privileges in the given group of enterprises and the
possibility of receiving all the considered privileges (received x number of
enterprises in the group divided by all privileges x number of enterprises in
the group). Compared to the average, privileges are allocated more fre-
quently if the group possessed any one of the politically rational criteria
mentioned above (I., P+, R+). They were even higher if any two of these
criteria were present and reached almost 100% if all three criteria were met.
Results point to systematic selection according the degree of integra-
tion, strategic importance of the given SOE. The repetition of distribution
along these criteria point to the intertwined economic and political spheres,
and suggests systematic, politically rational selection; as a reaction politi-
cally rational drive and accommodation to expectations for those pleading
resources (explaining drive for growth and for integration); it reflects an
industrial structure within the net that is forming along politically rational
selection criteria; and fixed paths of redistribution, along which selectively
soft budget constraint prevails conforming the level of integration within
the system. It also shows that economic behavior in party-states cannot be
complexly investigated without taking into consideration the interconnect-
edness of politics and economy and the institutional background (the net-
work) which produces that relationship.
If we rank the results of Table 2 according to the opportunity to acquire
resources and attach the characteristics of those who do or do not acquire
privilege, we arrive at power distribution along bargaining capacity among
the enterprises during 1970 and 1979 in Hungary (Figure 5, see on next
page).33
One can conclude to the existence of similar selective characteristics in
China concerning large state owned enterprises (SOEs), central, provincial,
county SOEs, the different levels of the administrative hierarchy and among
regions of a given level in the administrative hierarchy indirectly from the
writings of Burns, 1986, 1994; Wildasin, 1997; Walder, 1995; Yngyi Qian–
Gerald Roland, 1998; Sun, 1997; Huang, 1996; Perotti, 1993; Zou-Sun, 1996;
Lin, 1989; Granick, 1990; Chen, C. J., 1999; Goodman, 1994; Xiao-qiang,
1998, etc.
On the basis of the structural characteristics described above, Kornai's
arguments on soft budget constraints in party state systems are problematic
on several ground:
a)  By neglecting the structural motives that excite the scramble for quantity
and expansion, Kornai avoids reflecting on the structural and operational
specifics of party-state systems, which provide the very reason for such
motivation.
b) Therefore, at the same time, Kornai also misses the structural reasons that
explain the lack of such withholding considerations (economic
reasoning) in consequence of the political rationality of behavior,
c)  By neglecting structural characteristics and the dynamics stemming from
them, he misses the chance to reveal those structural inequalities in
bargaining capacity that will bring about selective redistribution and,
through that, selectively soft budget constraints which point to the
structural motives of the constant drive for further resources.
d) By neglecting the structural background of the selectivity in the
allocation and the selectively soft-budget constraint stemming from it and
behavioral motivations that conform to this structure, Kornai elevates a
subjective motivation (the inherent desire for growth) into a systemic
characteristic, instead of revealing the system's dynamics of self-
reproduction.
The next section will address the general characteristics of the IPS
model and consequently, comparability of the Chinese and Hungarian party-
state systems on the basis of this model.34
Figure 5 The distribution of power among enterprises by rank-ordering
the bargaining capacity (chances) of the enterprise groups with
different characteristics between 1970 and 1979 in Hungary (on
the basis of Table 2).
B. COMPARABILITY OF PARTY-STATES IN VIEW OF THE
GENERAL PROPERTIES OF THE IPS MODEL35
How do the above-described characteristics apply to the different party-
states at different periods? Do differences in size, in location,
developmental stage, historic period etc matter in this case? How can we
solve the issue of differences in size, institutional structure, geographic
location, operational specifics etc? Owing to its interactive structural and
dynamic properties, the IPS model reveals several general characteristics
of the party-state system that make comparison of individual cases viable:
I. The self-similar, fractal character, of party-state structures
The general characteristics of the IPS model flows from a specific feature
of party-states. The basis of the self-similarity (on fractals in the nature see
Mandelbrot, 1983) is that in party-states the main components, the main
connecting principles of these components and their principles of
operation are the same in several dimensions and so are the structural
motivations stemming from them (Csanádi and Lőrincz, 1992). This self-
similarity holds in time, that is, no matter during which period (e.g. the
Soviet Union in 1939 Fainsod, 1958 or in 1985 Bunce, 1983) the given
party-state is analyzed, these characteristics will be there. Self-similarity
will be discovered in space too, no matter which country one puts under
microscope at one given period (be it Rumania (Pacepa, 1989), Vietnam
(Sun, 1997), Hungary (Csanádi, 1997) or China (Qian and Xu, 1993). Self-
similarity will prevail even, concerning different levels of aggregation (a
factory shop-floor, – Walder, 1988; a district – Csanádi, 1997; a county –
Grossman, 1983; Hough, 1969, or a country and its federations – Bunce,
1999; Blagojevic, 1999, or even the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc
countries – Bunce, 1983). One may reveal self-similarity at the reaches of
the net even despite the different state of condition (developing or
disintegrating) of the party-state structure (see Russia in 1929–31
(Fainsod, 1958) or Hungary in 1987–88 (Csanádi, 1997) or China in 1997
(Qian-Wu, 2000).
For analytical simplicity, let us call as fractal (self-similar) unit any
one of the complex structural assemblages at any level of aggregation at
any time and any condition of the given structure. We shall call as sub-
units the ones located within the given aggregation, and supra-unit the
higher level aggregation where the unit is one of the sub-units. In
consequence of the fractal properties it is only a question of approach
whether a unit is analyzed as a sub-unit, unit, or supra-unit.
Based on this self-similarity the IPS model suggests that party-state
structures and operation – as country level fractal units as well as36
their different level aggregations at different times and state of
condition – are comparable. This comparability will hold, despite the
extreme differences in the size, geopolitical location, cultural specifics,
historical traditions, state of development of the society in which socialism
was formed. It will remain self-similar in the above context despite the
perplexing differences in the historical conditions at the formation of
party-states, in the developmental stage of these party-states, in the
departure from the Stalinist model was commenced, in the actual
international context of the time, in the world historical timing, in the
characteristics of the institutional structure, and in the level of
institutionalization, the level of decentralization of decisions.
II. The self-similarity in the dynamics of reproduction
Structural and operational self-similarities define self-similar dynamics of
behavior in the process of reproduction.
The self-similar dynamics of reproduction in a fractal unit – within that,
the dynamics of siphoning off and allocation of resources – will hold as long
as the basic principles of the system's functioning remain. Based on the
characteristic interactive party-state network in any fractal unit, the
simultaneous prevalence of (i) the ability to intervene, (ii) the compulsion to
intervene, (iii) the power of expectations, and (iv) the simultaneous vested
interest of the decision-makers in the maintenance of this situation, (v) the
specific selectivity of redistribution (intervention) based on political
rationality, resulting in selectively soft/hard budget constraints (vi) and the
drive for adaptation to redistribution criteria. All these elements preclude the
evolution of those factors which, at the reaches of the net (where the
interlinking threads reach out), would be able to control or constrain the self-
supporting mechanism of the politically monopolized system.
Until there are resources, the structural properties and the
principles of operation will define the decision-makers' motivation in
the fractal unit and by that ensure the cohesion and reproduction of the
unit's structure. These dynamic characteristics are self-similar in any
fractal unit – no matter the time, the space, the level of aggregation
and state of condition (developing or disintegrating) of the party-state
structure.
Based on the above-mentioned common (self-similar) structural
background, and dynamic principles, and structural motivators
stemming from them the IPS model suggests that the dynamics of
reproduction of party-state systems are also comparable. This will hold,37
despite the differences in the dynamics of the reproduction, and these
include the consciousness of strategic choices by the elite and counter-elite,
incremental versus radical reforms, the level of origin of reforms (from
below or from above), the temporal over sustained restructuring in power
relations, the centralized versus decentralized capacities of extraction and
distribution of resources, and the primacy of political transformation over
economic ones.
C. STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND OF DIVERGENCES
IN OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT PATHS
Self-similarities in the structure and in the principles of operation and in
the subsequent behavior justify the common basis for the comparison of
different party-states at different periods. But how can we solve the puzzle
of similar characteristics and different outcomes? How can we explain why
did they go through different ways of self-reproduction, used different in-
struments for that end and went to such dramatically different directions?
Are these mere questions of political and economic strategies? The IPS
model will reveal the structural background of the above differences within
the fractal. This background enhances and constrains the possible strate-
gies and outcomes.
I. The structural background of the wide-ranging structural varieties
in party-states
We assume that the built-in inequalities in dependencies and interest
promotion represent the self-similar character and principle of the
distribution of power in the IPS model in general. The concrete, specific
differences in the distribution of power within a fractal unit (no matter its
level of aggregation) will take shape due to the:
(i) The rigor (in requirements, implementation, control, adaptation,
tolerance and punishment of mal-accommodations and deviations)
within the party or state hierarchies,
(ii) density, variety, level of origin, tightness of connection of the
interlinking dependency threads, the fields that they overlap and the
depth they reach within a given field,
(iii)the level of origin of the feed backs, their density, level of connection
within or across hierarchies, the accumulation capacity of feedback and
(iv)the levels of decision-making capacity over the extraction and
distribution of state-monopolized resources38
The structural combinations of the variations in the rigor within the
hierarchies, the interlinking dependency threads, the feed-backs and the
level of decisions over the exploitation and redistribution of resources
will provide the differences in the distribution of power.
For example, the distribution of power in Hungary before and after 1956
revolution was drastically different, and so was in its construction or disin-
tegrating period (Csanádi, 1997). Between 1949 and 1953 its party and
state structure was very rigorous. Lacking alternative evaluation, accom-
modation and performance of subordinates were subjected and exposed to
voluntaristic judgements. Tolerance of non-performance depended on indi-
vidual verdicts. Decision-making and interlinking threads were centralized
and there were few feedbacks. Here is how a ministerial official looks back
on that period:
"I was supervising military hardware production and was thus lord over
life and death. Everything depended on us. Those were the good old days!
One was good looking, young, and had plenty of power. People of the status
of H. (the manager of one of the largest enterprises in Hungary - M.Cs.)
would come on their knees, crawling on their bellies for me to approve their
plans as fulfilled... I generally did not trust in such things and this had its
rewards. Three teams of enterprise leaders went to jail from under me for
smaller or bigger mistakes of this kind, while I remained firmly in my place.
My method was that I would not approve a plan as complete solely on the
basis of supplied information and without physical inspection. I would always
visit the enterprise and would verify plan fulfilment item by item."
(Department of Planning, Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Industry,
1977).
After 1956 until 1963 the rigor of the structure was decreased, deci-
sions in the party transferred to committees, interlinking threads became
relatively more decentralized and feedbacks from the economic sphere
evolved (Csanádi, 1997).
Therefore, the IPS model embraces and reflects individual charac-
teristics of a given country as a fractal unit or that of any administrative
sub-division within it, as well as that of their institutionalized conglom-
eration. These distributions may vary in time, in space, by level of aggre-
gation, and in consequence of the state of condition (state of develop-
ment, stability or disintegration) of the structure.
For example, great amplitude swings in the distribution of power may be
tracked between the beginning of the 1950s until the 1958–59, when a
highly centralized and strictly interlocked structure evolved (Barnett, 1967;
Huang, 1996; Burns, 1989), and from 1958-59 when the decentralization of
interlinking threads and economic jurisdictions took place during the Great39
Leap Forward (Barnett, 1967; Bachman, 1991; Naughton, 1987). This was
followed by a recentralization in 1961–65  (Huang, 1996), and the re-
decentralization of the interlinking threads and economic discretion over
enterprises and practically the abolition of central state and party
apparatus while increasing the political rigor during the Cultural
revolution between 1964 and 1976, (Huang, 1996; Burns, 1989; Barnett,
1967; Hong Yung, 1978; Lee, 1978; MacFarquhar, 1972, 1983) and the
short-lived re-centralization efforts after the death of Mao in 1978 (Huang,
1996; Naughton, 1996; Qian and Xu, 1993; Lieberthal, 1995; Burns, 1989).
Differences may be revealed not only in time but also in different
aggregations: at system level (Qian-Xu, 1993; Yin and Haines, 1997;
Manion, 1985; Burns, 1988; Naughton, 1997), at the level of different
regions (Oi, 1985, 1992, 1995, 1996; Steinfeld, 1998; Walder, 1995), at
enterprise level (Chamberlaine, 1987; Child and Xu, 1991; Bolton, 1995;
Granick, 1990), or at the shop-floor (Walder, 1988).
Those variations will last longer that accommodate to the individual
characteristics of the given fractal unit: to its size, historical and cultural tra-
ditions, level of institutionalization, geopolitical location, level of aggrega-
tion, level of industrialization, level of economic development and social
structure etc. Strategies of restructuring the net are constrained and enhanced
by those factors. The varying specifics do not harm the self-similar (fractal)
character of the basic elements, their connecting principles and their main
principles of operation. Neither they affect the motivations enhanced by the
general operating features of the structure.
Thus, based on the IPS model, structural differences in the specifics
of the distribution of power in party-states are also comparable.
II. Interaction of fractals and the influence of structural specifics
How do fractal units interact? To what extent are interactions influenced by
structural specifics? How these latter influence the dynamics of
reproduction? Let us now take both the fractal character and internal
varieties of distribution of power into consideration. Let us take a fractal unit
from the point of view of self-reproduction. In this respect, selective
resource allocation will show the unit's individual resource attracting
capacity. However, the budget constraints of a unit will not only depend on
the unit's capacity to attract resources, but also on its extracting capacity
from within its confines
15. This latter capacity is composed of two main
                                                
15 We shall include in the picture the unit's capacity to create extra resources by
borrowing money from banks. This may both mean extraction or attraction,40
factors: first, the extent of decision-making power (discretion) allocated
to the unit to extract resources. The extent of this allocation, as the
distribution of other privileges, depends on the attracting capacity of the
unit; that is, its size and its feedbacks (integration). Second, extracting
capacity depends on the specifics of the distribution of power within the
unit. Different extent of bargaining capacities of the sub-units within the unit
furnish the specifics of the given fractal unit. Specifics will allow or inhibit
further resource extraction and influence possible outcomes.
That is why the extent of extraction capacity of units may vary. For
example, the extraction capacity in Hungary until the middle 1980s was
concentrated exclusively in the central authorities, while in China this was
partially decentralized to the provinces and lower levels of the
administrative hierarchy. Meanwhile, allocation capacity in both countries
was partially decentralized, though it was to different extent.
Discretion over extraction or allocation, as other privileges, may be also
withdrawn. This depends on the resisting (menacing) capacity of the unit.
The conservation of these rights translate into personal stakes for those
privileged by them. By the allocation of extracting discretion, their own
redistributive potential may expand as their capacity to resist. This is the
reason why it is hard to reverse the tendency towards decentralization in
these jurisdictions. If withdrawn, redistribution potential may contract and
capacity to resist weaken.
Reversal efforts may be better resisted by those that have more
bargaining capacity. Consequently, reversal, that may be taken as extraction,
will be selective and structure conforming.
Such were the repeated efforts to centralize resources at the beginning and
end of the 1980s in China and their limited success (Naughton, 1991, 1996).
Similar factors drew central authorities to exert serious political pressure
and compensating offers to alter the structure and discretion of resource
extraction between the center and the provinces in tax reforms. (Interview,
2000; Huang, 1996; Sun, 1997; Shu-ki and Yuk-shing, 1994.)
                                                                                                                                              
depending on whether the loaner is within or outside the unit's confines respectively.
If outside, loans may be attracted from higher level aggregations or from outside the
net. Likewise, fund raising within or outside the unit are factors of extracting or
attracting resources respectively. Also the creation or allowing the creation of
resourceful units outside the net means attraction (though not necessarily from above
the unit), with the purpose of increasing the possible subjects for extraction. For the
time being we shall neglect the direct money printing capacity which is allocated to
the central level only, though in China before 1994 local governments had possibility
of increasing directed bank loans unlimited (Wong, 1991; Qian and Weingast, 1997;
Bachman, 1991, p. 222).41
Therefore,  allocation (redistribution) will be selective along the
different extent of attracting capacity of the units, while extraction will
be selective along the different resisting capacity of the sub-units. In
practice, a unit will possess both attracting and resisting capacity as pleader
and allocating or extracting capacity as intervener.
– The larger the unit, the more and higher intra- and cross-hierarchy
feedbacks are accumulated and the closer the interlinking dependency
lines to the unit's aggregation level, the stronger will be the unit's resisting
(attracting) capacity, and therefore, the weaker the supra-unit's extracting
capacity.
– The smaller the sub-units, the less and lower intra-and cross-hierarchy
feedbacks they possess, and the higher the interlinking dependency lines
depart from the sub-unit's aggregation level, the fainter will be the sub-
units resisting capacity; therefore the stronger will be the unit's extracting
(enforcing) capacity.
Thus, within the confines of the IPS model, interaction of fractal
units and the influence of structural specifics in the interaction are
comparable.
III. Interactions, budget constraints and different distributions of
power in the process of reproduction
What impact the different extents of extracting over attracting capacity will
have on budget constraints and how will this influence the behavior of the
unit?
a)  At one extreme, let us suppose that the unit will be dependent
exclusively on allocation, that is, its extracting capacity is zero. It may or
may not further allocate to its sub-units the resources it had attracted,
according to the decentralization of decision-making over allocation. This
means that factors that increase the unit's capacity to attract resources
become crucial. In this case, no unit will have any other choice but to
"channel in" and strive for resources from "above"
16. Success depends on the
extent of the unit's resource attracting capacity from the higher-level
aggregation.
On the one hand, the higher the unit's capacity to attract, the softer
will be the unit's budget constraint. The unit will do its utmost to acquire
or maintain the properties that attract resources (growth by investment,
                                                
16 In case of the final aggregation, if no extraction is possible "open door" policy will
be declared in order to attract further resources. Leaping out of the net has its
consequences in adaptation.42
takeover and accumulation of feedbacks) and strive for the decentralization
of the interlinking threads. Lacking extracting capacity, it will strive to
increase its size, and that of its sub-units will become indirectly important.
The importance will emerge from the point of view of enlarging its
economic potential to enhance the unit's bargaining capacity. This may be
achieved by bearing or acquiring sub-units that may be capable of menacing
the stability (internal supply, non-fulfilment of contingencies, political
tensions, and so on) of the unit as a whole or that of higher level
aggregations
17. This is the reason why these units strive to increase the
economic potential of SOEs located in their neighborhood or for the
allocation of jurisdiction over larger SOEs, subordinated to the higher level
aggregation.
That was the one of the reasons why local party organizations strove for the
allocation of the headquarters of large enterprises or new centrally planned
investments under their nomenklatura responsibility (Csanádi, 1997). Similar
motivations must have driven Chinese provinces and lower level governments
in the 1980s to lobbying for the decentralization of SOEs that pertained to
higher level administration (Sun, 1997, p. 10.; referring to Lin, Cai and Li
1995; Naughton 1995; Walder 1994 and 1995).
On the other hand, the lower the unit's attracting capacity, the harder will
be its budget constraint. The extent of the attraction capacity of the unit
may tend to zero. This is the case if fractal units do not meet selection
criteria of allocation.
One of the telling examples is that inefficiency of enterprises in Hungary
was inducing selective windups. The rate of inefficient large enterprises to
the small ones was overwhelmingly much higher than the rate of windups of
                                                
17 The phantom strength – and through this, the bargaining capacity – of the regional
economic policy leadership increased, the larger were the enterprises that had their
headquarters there. Indeed, the regional leadership could exercise greater influence in
receiving privileges with this weapon. Similar results were achieved in the distribution
of central funds affecting the region, in labour force policy, in regional development, in
the status of the region, and so on. For in this case (having larger enterprises in these
regions) it was possible to obtain higher- level protectors. The arguments relating to the
factors endangering stability also carried more weight regardless of whether the given
region was a county or a district. Therefore, it was in the interest of the regional party
organizations to support the growth of these enterprises and obtain as many feedback
opportunities as possible. At the same time, it was also important that they be able to
exercise an ever-greater level of influence within these enterprises in order to keep
them under their own control. One way of achieving this was to incorporate their
leaders into the ranks of the local political elite.43
large enterprises over small ones. Bailout was much more frequent in case
of the large than small SOEs (Csanádi, 1997). Similar phenomena may be
traced in China after 1984 concerning loss-making SOEs (Shu, 1998 p. 393
cited by Zou and Sun, 1996, p. 11–12). They argue that the less profitable the
more bargaining capacity with the center or the banks). Not only enterprises
but regions and bail-outs point to similar selection criteria (Wildasin, 1997
cited by Qian-Roland, 1998 p. 1444).
With harder budget constraint, when extraction capacity is not given,
survival efforts will force units to "channel in" and compensate their lack of
attracting capacity by joining, or indirectly profiting on those that do have a
bargaining capacity.
This was experienced in Hungary in the 1970s (Csanádi, 1997) in the case
of smaller SOEs that sub-contracted the larger ones in order to obtain
scarce raw materials and spare-parts acquired by those in consequence of
their better bargaining position.
Moreover, no matter if budget constraints are hardening or softening, if
resource attraction is the unique opportunity actors will not be interested in
leaving the net. These structural conditions will project the motives for
behavior and the tendency of the struggle in the reproduction process.
For example, despite of Hungary having a law since the middle of the 1980s
allowing enterprise subsidiaries to detach from the mother enterprise very
few such actions took place until the end of the 1980s when these actions
begun to mushroom. From the end of the 1980s until the mid 1990s the 50
largest enterprises in the processing industry disintegrated into more than
690 units (Voszka, 1997).
b) The opposite extreme situation is when discretion over extraction and
distribution is given while no resources are allocated from above. In this
case, budget constraints will depend solely on the unit's capacity to extract
resources from within itself. Success depends on the extent of the resisting
capacity of its sub-units. The lower the resisting capacity, the softer will be
the unit's budget constraint. The higher is the resisting capacity, the harder
will be the unit's budget constraint. In this latter case, the interest of
enhancing the growth of economic sub-units within the unit's confines is
constrained by the interest of increasing extracting capacity within the net.
Therefore, the unit strives for further centralization of the interlinking
threads within its realms and for more, smaller, and less fed-back sub-units
with less bargaining (resisting) capacity.
This might have been one of the reasons why at country level – opposite to
the previous period – efforts to break up (instead of further developing)44
large enterprises in Hungary were the main political issue in the middle of
the  1980s. That was the period when resources from outside decreased
radically, since Western loans were to be repaid and extractive capacity of
the system was decreasing at a large pace. Restructuring though had
limited results because large enterprises with accumulated feedbacks could
resist (Voszka, 1988). Concerning China, this might have been the reason
why Chinese SOEs subordinated to local governments enabled with
extracting capacity did not grow to such an extent (Huang, 1996; Naughton,
1996) as in Eastern European countries, where extractive capacity was
allocated to the central authorities.
In consequence of the fractal character, and the specificity of the
distribution of power within the units or its different level aggregations, one
unit, as a sub-unit, may be part of one kind of power distribution, while
containing within itself an other kind of power distribution. Therefore, the
unit's situation, motives and behavior directed upwards, might be
dramatically different from those directed downwards. The combination of
the different or same extent of attracting (resisting) over extracting
(allocating) capacity is produced by the different or similar patterns of
power concerning the unit and within it.
For example, Hungary within the Soviet bloc had resource attracting and
extracting capacity, while within its confines resource extraction and
distribution was mainly reserved for the central institutions. Resource
extraction and redistribution though, in consequence of the given
distribution of power (the bargaining and resisting capacity of the
resourceful sub-units) from time to time reach their limits. On the other
hand, China as a whole, after the break-up with the Soviet Union in the
early  1960s until the beginning of the 1970s had practically very low
resource attracting capacity (Lieberthal, 1988). Meanwhile extraction of
resources at the time of the Great Leap forward or the Cultural Revolution
was extremely decentralized with a distribution of power (tight interlinking
threads) that allowed the extraction of resources without the capacity of the
sub-units to resist (Barnett, 1967).
The combination of different or similar extent of the attraction and
extraction capacities will provide the extent of soft/hard budget
constraint of the unit. Motivations and strategies at a given period are
instigated by the projected and experienced extent of the softness or
hardness of the budget constraint. Behavioral strategies are shaped by
expectations concerning extracting (allocating) and attracting (resisting)
capacities as estimated by past experiences and current judgements
18.
                                                
18 This calculation depends on the complex interplay of conditions: the extent of actual45
Experienced success or failure of behavior is defined by the actual position
of distribution capacity of the given unit, which defines its position toward
its sub-units. The harder the budget constraint, the weaker is the unit's
distribution capacity and its position toward its sub-units. The softer the
unit's budget constraint, the stronger is its distribution capacity, and its
position towards its sub-units. Therefore, a unit will strive for stronger
attracting, resisting, allocating and extracting capacity.
How can budget constraint be defined at an interacting fractal unit?
Taking fractal, internal variations of power distribution and
interactions into consideration a new concept of system- and structure-
specific budget constraint is introduced within the IPS model. This
specific budget constraint that we call IPS budget constraint is defined
by several factors:
a) IPS budget constraint is not only generally soft (Kornai,  1980), but
selectively. Therefore, budget constraints in party-states may be hard
too. This selectivity is defined by the bargaining capacity of a unit that
presuppose properties that match (or do not match) with the politically
rational priorities of the distributor.
b) Moreover, not only allocation, but resisting capacity to extraction will
define the unit's relationship to the allocator. Resisting capacity is also
selective, depending on the unit's resources to challenge the stability of
the allocator.
The combination of attracting and resisting capacity of a fractal unit
will define its bottom-up balance of resources. However, not only the
unit's bottom-up interactions matter. Budget constraints are shaped by the
unit's top-down interactions as well:
a) Resources of a unit depend also on its capacity of extraction that is
defined by the resisting capacity of its sub-units according to the
distribution of power among sub-units in relation to the unit.
b) Moreover, not only extraction, but the unit's resource allocations (the size
of which is shaped by its capacity to attract from above, its allowance to
distribute, and success in extracting from within its confines) will define
the unit's relation to its sub-units. Allocation of the unit will occur
according to the selective attracting capacity of the sub-units.
                                                                                                                                              
openness of the unit, political opportunity within and outside the unit, perception of
internal stability and legitimacy (leader's position, internal fights within the elite, sense
and sensitivity for tensions, tolerance of tensions), external position (recognition from
outside, geopolitical location, political opportunity, tolerance toward the unit's activity)
the unit's judgement of its own and adversaries phantom force and projected risks on
the basis of the cited factors etc.46
The combination of the unit's extraction and redistribution capacity
will furnish its top-down interactions and define its top-down balance of
resources.
The combined (IPS) budget constraints of a unit will be shaped by
the combination of its top-down and bottom-up interactions.
Interactions themselves are shaped by the distribution of power bottom
up and top-down. Selectively soft/hard budget constraints will adapt to
the structural varieties in the distribution of power both top-down and
bottom-up. Therefore, the combined IPS budget constraints will be also
structure-specific.
Let us formalize the above arguments. Figure 6  (see on next page)
relates the interactions concerning one unit as pleader bottom up (resisting
and attracting) and as intervener (allocating and extracting) top down.
Taking this concept into consideration, an infinite variety and extent
of budget constraints may evolve as a consequence of power relations
and interactions during the process of reproduction. Since AoR may be
larger, smaller or equal to UoR, therefore, bottom-up balance (BUB) may
become positive, zero or negative. The same is true of EoR and RoR.
Therefore, top-down balance (TDB) may become positive, zero or negative
too. Consequently, the combination of the two balances will reflect the
extent of softness or hardness of the budget constraint. Let us write down
these combinations:       AoR - UoR > 0 (if AoR > UoR)
AoR - UoR < 0 (if AoR < UoR)
AoR - UoR = 0 (if AoR = UoR)
EoR - RoR > 0 (if EoR > RoR)
EoR - RoR < 0 (if EoR < RoR)
EoR - RoR = 0 (if EoR = RoR)47
Notations:
Bottom up:
AoR  =  Attraction of Resources by the unit
UoR  =  Uprooting of Resources from the unit
Top down:
EoR = Extraction of resources by the unit
RoR = Redistribution of Resources by the unit
Key:
BUB: Bottom-Up (BU) balance
TDB: Top-Down (TD) balance
BUB-TDB: Total balance that determines budget constraints
Figure 6 Interactions of a (fractal) unit of the fractal structure giving
rise to various types of budget constraints
The extent of complex soft/hard budget constraints will evolve in the
following way:
(AoR - UoR) + (EoR - RoR) = BUB + TDB = IPS Budget constraint (BC)
Table 3 shows the variations in the extent of soft/hard budget constraints
considering the balances of the BUB and TDB:
AoR - UoR = BUB













Table 3 Soft/hard budget constraint variations in the
Interactive Party-State model
BC BUB=0 BUB >0 BUB <0
TDB =0 0,0 0,+ 0,-
TDB >0 +,0 +,+ +,-
TDB<0 -,0 -,+ -,-
Therefore, IPS budget constraint is a combined, multi-layered,
structure-specific consequence of interactions during the process of self-
reproduction. The extent of net attracting over net extracting capacity of a
unit will determine the extent of the combined softness/hardness of its
budget constraints (IPS BC). The extent of softness/hardness will induce the
variety of motivations. However, behind the different or even similar extent
of IPS budget constraints lie the structural specifics of the given unit. While
the extents of budget constraint define motivations, structural
conditions of the unit (shaped by the pattern of power distribution at
the unit's aggregation and the distribution of power within the unit) will
define and shape the varieties of possible behavior and strategies during
reproduction.  Accordingly, not only budget constraints, but also
behavior will be structure-specific.
Motivations may be directed to keep or to modify status quo. On the one
hand, except – -, 00, 0 – any of the above-described combinations may be
positive, meaning soft budget constraint. In this case reproduction at a given
period does not meet structural constraints. The extent of softness depends
on the positive term in the expression. The softness of budget constraint
justifies the techniques implemented, therefore there are no reasons to
change only reasons to strive to maintain or improve the status quo.
On the other hand, with the exception of ++, +0, 0+ and 00 any of these
combinations may be negative, depending on the extent of the negative term
in the equation. Even those cases pointed out as exceptions, may tend to
zero. But all of them may tend to, or acquire a different extent of hard
budget constraints. When mechanisms of reproduction meet structural
constraints motivations are driven to change the status quo.
Decision-makers do not aim directly at having soft budget
constraints, but to acquire resources in some way of another. The
dominant conditions determined by the current bargaining position of a
unit, or sub-unit within a fractal that force the kind of adaptation and49
motives. If resources may be acquired though enhancing bargaining
position or exerting pressure through the net than that will be the
chosen way. If resources are acquirable only through producing
marketable values and by that becoming profitable, than that will be the
chosen strategy.
IPS budget constraints become hard when there are no further internal
and external possibilities for the siphoning-away or attraction of new
resources within the given power distribution. In these cases the self-
supporting mechanism meets structural constraints. The cohesion of the
system (or smaller unit) weakens and the power relations change either
permanently or temporarily (those privileged and those privileging weaken).
These conditions create the motivation to restore the cohesion of the
structure. To that end, each combination induces a variety of possible
actions according to expectations and will result in a variety of
outcomes according to structural constraints.
Taking fractal character into consideration – hard and/or soft
budget constraints may be present in one time in different aggregations,
and at the same level in different spaces. They may be present also in
different times on the same or different aggregations. In sum, they may
be present sequentially in one unit and simultaneously in different units
19.
Therefore, units on a formally equal level of aggregation or different
aggregations in consequence of the extent of attracting and extracting
capacity may differ according to their structural constraints. This capacity is
determined by the aggregated and individual structural properties.
In Hungary for example even after the 1968 reforms resource
extraction and redistribution capacity was appropriated only to central
authorities, while the distribution of power was relatively decentralized,
with high level of bargaining capacity of fed back SOEs (Csanádi, 1997). In
China after the mid 1980s the extraction and redistribution capacity was
decentralized to local governments, (though the extent of it was selectively
distributed (Lin, 1989). The distribution of power took very different shapes
within the fractal units on national level aggregation, within and among
province level and at different hierarchical levels of the administration
within them (Zhao Xiobin, 1996, Huang, 1990). The different shape of the
power structure and therefore, different extracting capacity was partially
due to the selective distribution of SOEs among provinces and under
different ranks of administration, the distribution of SOEs within one formal
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the field the interlinking lines connect or avoid. E.g. in certain party-states the
agriculture has hard budget constraints while the industry has soft.50
level of jurisdiction, the number of TVEs (township and village enterprises)
in the region, the FDI (foreign direct investment) etc.
Both hard and soft budget constraints may be present temporarily
or for sustained time within the above variations. Status quo may change
if either bargaining capacity of the unit changes bottom up, or toward its
sub-units top-down, and therefore extraction and attraction of resources
meet structural constraints. Soft budget constraints will be temporary (turn
to hard) also if the maintenance of status quo exhausted resources in the
unchanged structural conditions and further resource acquisition is needed to
eliminate the resistance of the internal structure.
Hard budget constraints will be temporary, if power relations are
restructured and resistance of sub-units discontinued. Restructuring of
power relations may be avoided and hard budget constraints will turn
temporary soft if further resource attraction becomes available from outside
the net (e.g. opening up to acquire foreign loans and techniques). But this
fortunate situation comes to an end, once loans and interests have to be
repaid. (concerning Hungary see Antal, 1979, 1983, 1985). This time will
arrive under worse structural conditions from the point of view of budget
constraints, since foreign loans to this point have been granted to maintain
the status quo. This only reinforced those privileged along the fixed paths
of redistribution. The resistance to extraction of those so privileged will be
stronger, while there are no more resources to attract and distribute.
Thus, within the confines of the IPS model,  interactions, and
specifics of the development of structure conforming budget constraints
during self-reproduction in party-states are comparable.
IV. Structure-specific behavior and adequate mechanisms of repro-
duction
Do structural specifics influence the length of the period under which
cohesion may be restored? Does restructuring require (allow) instruments
irrespective of structural specifics?
We argue that both the mode and the time-lapse of removing the
obstacles to the reproduction mechanism and, thereby, recreating the
cohesion are structure-specific. In other words, the specific structures
will induce adequate mechanisms of reproduction through specific
instruments for resource attraction, extraction and redistribution.
The fainter the capability of sub-units to resist and influence through
the dependency threads and feed-backs, the bigger the capacity of the unit51
to exert pressure in the given distribution of power. Therefore, no matter
the level of aggregation, in these cases resources are extracted through
forceful restructuring by exerting political pressure and/or implementing
campaigns. Forceful restructuring, in consequence of the adopted
restrictions and re-centralization of resources and jurisdictions, will result
in  resource-redeployment.  These are for example:  changes in the
product-structure, merging of enterprises, amalgamation or disaggregation
of agricultural co-operatives, reorganization of economic management
authorities, the so-called "off budgetary" and "extra budgetary" revenues in
China (Huang, 1996; Wu and Qian, 1999; Lin, 1989), forced exports for
the sake of funding imports, forced fund raising, forced capital raising,
forced workers' share (Smyth,  1998), forced acquisition of state bonds
(interview, 2000) etc.
The extent of pressuring capacity will influence the length of the period
of hard budget constraints and the threat of incohesion. The greater the
extent of pressuring capacity, the shorter the period of hard budget
constraints and with that, the lack of cohesion. Conversely, the fainter the
extracting capacity within a given unit, the smaller the unit's capacity to
apply successfully the former resource extracting instruments.
The longer its period and the higher the expectations for hardening
budget constraints, and with that, the lack of cohesion, the stronger the unit's
drive to find other ways to reveal or create resources to restore the
reproduction process and status quo. When and where forced
restructuring does not work, reforms are instruments for such
purposes. In this respect, reforms, instigated by longer-term budget
constraints are, in a given distribution of power instruments to acquire
resources and to recreate the structure's cohesion.
The above way of defining reforms requires a structural approach that
analyzes the process of self-reproduction. But a structural approach is not
the sole way to define reforms. Reforms may be classified along other
analytical paths for example, according their focus.
For example, a reform of economic policy (changes in regulators, new
enterprise management methods, the introduction of a job application
system); a reform of the instruments of economic management (shifting
from mandatory plans to indirect regulators, or from bureaucratic
coordination to market co-ordination); a reform of the institutions in the
management of the economy (the creation of new economic management
authorities and spheres of influence and the transformation of others); a
reform of the economy's institutions (enterprise reorganizations, break-ups,
the possibility to close down enterprise units, the possible creation of
subsidiaries; a reform of the pattern of economic activity (private plot52
cultivation, supplementary branches, second economy, the possibility to
create small business); and a reform of the institutional system of politics
(the introduction of multi-candidacy in parliamentary elections, and in the
election of party, CYF (Communist Youth Federation in Hungary) and trade
union secretaries, the restriction of the mandate of those elected for a limited
duration, the restriction of re-election possibilities, the decentralization of the
nomenklatura system). Such reforms rarely appeared in isolation from each
other and their character was shaped according to the type that dominated.
The classification from the point of view of focus does not exclude that these
reforms have their structural background, moreover, structural impact.
From the point of view of the analysis our approach remains structural,
focused on the process of self-reproduction. We shall enumerate from this
point of view different kinds of reforms. The focus is on whether the
applied instruments will create resources inside or outside the network
according to their capacities of restructuring power relations. Thus, there
are reforms that remain within the framework of the unit and those that
leap out of it.
Let us call resource mobilizing reforms those actions that remain
within the confines of the net and directly reveal formerly hidden
resources, or "disentangle" formerly possessed interest-promoting
channels that indirectly reveal resources. For example, extra resources
are mobilized within the net through the introduction of normative, macro-
measures: a quasi-world market price system, profit-sharing or income-
taxation system. Extra resources within the net are mobilized also if
burdens are reallocated. This may take place either by decentralization
(SOEs from central subordination to that of province or county in China),
or pressures for centralization (e.g. social responsibilities – housing,
healthcare, pension – from Chinese SOEs to local governments), or making
selective allocation stricter (e.g. the centralization of import decisions in
the late 1970s in Hungary), or decreasing the attracting capacity of sub-
units by weakening their feed-backs (e.g. merging and abolishing branch
(line) ministries and depriving them of their interest enforcing capacities
and functions, and for the same reason decentralizing the nomenklatura of
enterprise managers from the ministry to enterprises themselves and local
party organizations), weakening the bargaining capacity of the sub-units
themselves (e.g. disbanding large enterprises), or even by transferring
burdens outside the net (e.g. privatization of SOEs) and thereby decreasing
the number of sub-units striving for allocation.
Let us call resource creating reforms those actions that partially or
completely leap out the net to acquire new resources. If structural
change within the net is not possible, because of the strength or the lack of53
resourceful sub-units, the intensity of the drive for resources forces the
creation of resourceful units outside the reaches of the net, or the attraction
of alternative resources partially outside of it. The higher the expectations
for harder budget constraints the more intensive the pressure to leap out will
be. Extra resources are created by facilitating the infiltration of resources
from outside into the net (e.g. TVEs in China, second economy in
Hungary, or FDI in joint ventures, or transforming SOEs into shareholding
companies, or listing them on the stock exchange). Extractable resources
are created by letting increase the number of resourceful units outside the
net (e.g. the enhancement of conditions for domestic and foreign private
ventures, private plot cultivation, the abolishment of collectives and
cooperatives, the alternative consequences of the privatization of SOEs
20
etc).
We argue that resource redeployment and reforms demonstrate that
resource acquiring instruments are structure specific. Moreover, re-
source mobilizing and resource creating reforms demonstrate that the
kinds of reforms introduced are also structure-specific. Implementation
depends on the decision-making capacity, the distribution of power within
one unit and the extent of hardness/softness of IPS budget constraints of the
given unit at a certain period. Even strategies are strongly influenced by the
expectations, learned and experienced consequences and projected risks etc.
According to the modifications of the structure and to the extent of
hardness/softness of the IPS budget constraint at different periods, these in-
struments may be also alternatively implemented. Successful implementa-
tion of one or another though is primarily structure conforming and
driven more by the force of constraints than by strategic choice. However,
despite its alternative use concerning a whole unit, every chance is utilized
on partial fields within a unit where the bargaining and resisting capacity is
weaker. There are constant efforts to take the easier path first (Naughton,
1996), by reorganizing, or exerting pressure, and only if these prove to be
unsuccessful (counter-selective according to the interests of the sub-units),
will the other instruments be used.
For example, in consequence of the decentralized extracting capacity to the
units and resisting capacity of the units as sub-units in a higher level
aggregation, resource redeployment efforts from higher level aggregation
                                                
20 According to the utilization of resources earned from privatization resources may be
re-deployed if used for the subsidization of remaining SOEs, or social causes, and
may conclude in resource creation if invested in joint ventures or infrastructure or
shares in private enterprises etc.54
will be counterproductive. This was the case of the short-lived resource
centralizing austerity measures in China in the beginning of the 1980 and at
the end of 1980s – beginning of 1990s (Naughton, 1996; Huang, 1997;
Interview, 2000). Similarly will resource redeployment efforts be
counterproductive in a structure where resisting capacity of sub-units is
unharmed (see for example the referred failed efforts concerning the partition
of large enterprises in Hungary at the beginning of the 1980s (Voszka, 1988).
The lower the expectations for sustained hard budget constraints, the
more frequent resource mobilizing reforms. Accordingly, the higher the ex-
pectations for sustained hard budget constraints, the more frequent addi-
tional resource creating reforms. No reforms occur when resources are avail-
able within the given structure (whether through allocation, domestic or for-
eign loans, raising funds, printing money, or the capacity of forceful exploi-
tation of resources from within).
In a complex fractal structure different instruments of resource ac-
quisition may be implemented and different kind of reforms may take
place according to structural specifics. This may occur at the same pe-
riod both at different levels of aggregation, or at different units at same
level aggregations and in different times. Therefore, parallel to the dif-
ferent kind of reforms, resource extraction through forced restructuring
may also occur at different units of an aggregation or at different ag-
gregations of the same level or at the same unit at different times.
These instruments may be implemented sequentially or simulta-
neously in time, in space on the same level aggregations, and in different
level aggregations and in different state of condition of the given power
structure.
This also means that no positive or negative connotations should be
attached to reforms from above or from below (Liu, 1992; Lin and al., 1995;
Naughton, 1994). First, this is because "above" and "below" in a fractal
structure are relative concepts, since according to the level of aggregation of
the fractal, reform drives may emerge either from above or below. Second,
this is because the mode depends on the structural properties and condition
of the unit and not on its locus in the structure.
A good example for this statement is that until 1994, decisions over
fiscal and monetary discretion were decentralized to provinces to such an
extent that even money printing was possible in the form of credit extension.
The leading positions of local branches of the National Bank were
delegated to the nomenklatura responsibilities of the local party
organizations, local branches were successfully forced to extend credit.
Therefore, economic behavior from below caused an uncontrollable price55
and investment boom overheating the economy (Huang, 1996, Lin, 1989).
The 1994 reforms took back this discretion: provincial level branches were
abolished and regional level units were formed. Another example is that of
the similar behavior of SOEs within the politically rational environment of
the net. Groves (1994) found that the increased enterprise autonomy in their
sample of 769 SOEs for 1980–1989 raised worker's incomes but tended not to
increase profits or lower the state subsidies (referred by Qian, 1996 p. 444.).
Similar arguments may be raised on the investment hunger of enterprises
insensitive to interest rates (Xiao-qiang, 1998) or on the behavior of
Township and Village Governments (TVGs), that exercised property rights
over TVEs and profits were directed to TVGs who used this for the
improvement of the local life, rather than reinvesting in successful enterprises
or decreasing depts. Smyth, 1998) .
The same holds for the "decentralization" of decisions in general as
such, without structural connotations.
For example, when the Chinese communes were given extraordinary
decision-making power over resources in the 1950s, they did not behave in
market-like fashion. Instead, the commune took over ownership of all the
important remnants of private enterprise, except private homes; these
included not only the peasants' private plots and animals but also family
cooking utensils. Meals took place in public halls. (Barnett, 1967 p. 341)
Thus, within the confines of the IPS model differences in structure-
specific behavior as well as adequate instruments of self-reproduction in
party-state systems are comparable.
V. Impact of different mechanisms of self-reproduction on the party-
state structure
Let us recall some former statements. The different attracting and extracting
enforcing and resisting capacities, and, accordingly, the different kinds of
hardening budget constraints will incite structure-conforming behavior and
structure conforming instruments of resource acquisition. The stronger the
resisting capacity of sub-units, the more frequently the unit will run into the
barriers of resource extraction in the given distribution of power, and the
harder it will be to locate and extract new resources with the restructuring of
the net. The fainter the resisting capacity, the more seldom the unit will run
into barriers to resource extraction and the shorter the time lapse during
which cohesion is regenerated. The more decentralized the extraction
capacity and the stronger the resisting capacity of sub-units the more
frequently will the unit hit the barrier of reproduction within the net and the56
stronger will be the drive to create resources outside the net. Conversely, the
more centralized the extraction capacity and the fainter the sub-units'
resisting capacity the more seldom the unit will hit the barriers of
reproduction within the net and the stronger will be the drive to reveal
resources within the net. No reason neither force generates reforms if
resources may be extracted by redeployment. Similarly, no reason
neither force generates reforms that create resources outside the net if
inside they may be mobilized.
What effect do the structure-conforming behavior and instruments have
on the development of the structure? Do they justify the different outcomes
in party-states despite likely similarity of the systems? We argue that the
structure conforming drives and instruments for resource acquisition
will have very different effects on the structure and the process of self-
reproduction. These effects are responsible for the different outcomes in
reforming party-states and also for the differences in reforming and
non-reforming party-states.
Resource mobilizing reforms occur in a structural pattern where
discretion over the extraction of resources is centralized, while resisting
capacity of sub-units is relatively high (see in Hungary). These kinds of
reforms will remain within the framework of the net. Consequently,
mobilized resources will be allocated invariably on the basis of politically
rational criteria. contributing to the maintenance of fixed paths. The
continuous drive for revealing and exploiting further resources to distribute
will cause reform escalation. Escalation will occur without the creation of
new resourceful units and the capacity to abandon forced paths (Csanádi,
1997; Steinfeld, E. 1998). Meanwhile, in consequence of the reforms
tensions will arise, because of growing difficulties in maintaining traditional
interlinking lines (D2) reaching out to the multitude of organizations,
activities and positions. Moreover, the activity of using the net will decrease,
since there are no expectable allocations through it. The recurring drives for
sustaining self-reproduction will gradually disintegrate the net. However,
reform escalation will disintegrate the net without creating alternative
resources and alternative rationality of behavior, while continuously
hardening the budget constraint. When budget constraints become
persistently hard since no further resources may be attracted or extracted in
the given structure resource creating reforms are introduced, decentralization
of interlinking threads accelerate, extracting discretion are partially
decentralized. By that time when though, in this structural pattern the
condition of the structure has deteriorated to such extent, that cohesion may
not be regenerated and collapse takes place. Where resource-mobilizing57
reforms dominate, disintegration, collapse and transformation will be
sequential.
When does collapse occur? Collapse occurs if implementations of the
different instruments are unsuccessful, and the budget constraint becomes
persistently hard. Consequently,  expectations for either attracting or
extracting resources within the unit vanish and interlinking threads are either
vacated, become irrelevant, or break. There is no reason for the sub-units to
remain within the unit’s confines. With the collapse of the given net both the
principles of operation and the structural motivations induced by them
vanish.
Where do collapses occur? Collapse, in consequence of the fractal
character may occur at any aggregation level. It may be segregated
(partial), but may be total. Therefore, depending on the level of
aggregation it may occur unperceived or may have cumulative
consequences
21. This depends on the specific pattern (degree of inter-
relatedness with other levels of aggregation), the actual level of aggregation
itself, the window of opportunity and learned experiences. The more
interpenetrated and the more centralized the structure, the more cumulative
the collapse.
What kind of collapse may occur? Depending on the specific pattern
(interlinking lines, feedbacks and discretion over resources) collapse may
be smooth or abrupt: smooth, where collapse was pre-empted and
prompted by gradual disintegration, abrupt if that process did not take place.
Disintegration is not the necessary precondition for collapse. Collapse is not
the necessary precondition for transformation. Collapse may be both
followed or pre-empted by disintegration and transformation.
Transformation begins when also the main elements of the structure are
challenged for a prolonged time
22. This challenge may affect these elements
either simultaneously or gradually. Alternative resource acquiring
possibilities emerge, competitive logic begin to presenting themselves,
alternative rules are being enforced, and alternative behavior promises to
bear fruit. In these cases, the emptying of the rigid structures accelerates (in
China see Smyth, 1998). On the one hand, the more capable units strike out
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point of view of the unit, partial transformations or collapses on lower levels will be
politically tolerable. Meanwhile at the system level they may have irreversible
consequences for the system itself.
22 Just to remind: these are the Party, the State, state property, the interlinking threads, the
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from the former framework (be they individual decision-makers (Laki, 1991;
Gordon and D. Li, 1997), economic units (Voszka, 1997), or whole regions
Bunce, 1999). On the other hand, drives to get rid of the burden increase –
either through decentralization, or shutdowns, or even selling off.
The waning or disappearance of the elements of self-similarity will
increase the role and impact of specific patterns. In other words, on the one
hand, the legacies of the fractal structure will provide the transformation
process with important common characteristics and common reaction to
these characteristics.
These characteristics are the following: strategic overweight of state
property, overwhelming state intervention, inherited rigid structures, fluidity
of the forming structure, cumulative uncertainty, dynamic tensions, excessive
idiosyncrasies in decision-making, consequently, short-term horizons, short-
term interests. Reactions to these characteristics include: short-term criteria
in reorientation, drives for emptying the rigid structures, asset stripping, rent
seeking behavior (Bunce and Csanádi, 1993; Csanádi, 1997).
On the other hand, internal specifics of the given former structure will
determine differences in the extent of the above characteristics, and the
degree of violence these processes generate (Csanádi, 1997a, b).
In more details, those features which caused the vast variety of party-state
structures will have a great impact on the conditions of departure, on the
turmoil in the transformation, on the direction of the institutionalization and
on the differences among forming political structures. They will strongly
influence the degree of rigidity of the inherited structures, the level of
tensions, the speed and depth of disintegration and restructuring, the level of
devastation and exposure in the society and economy, and the force to
adaptation. They also influence the chances for the stabilization of new
emerging structures, the level of uncertainty during the transformation, the
potential threat of social explosion, the social basis of extreme movements
and parties as well as their success or failure. Moreover, not only fractals on
system level and their specifics will influence transformation and
institutionalization, but fractal units on different levels having different
internal distribution of power will do so. The different dynamics of
transformation of these units (be they federal, provincial or other territorial
fractal units, enterprises etc.) conforming their former internal distribution of
power will also contribute to the complexity and richness of the structure and
consequently to the variations of the transformation processes.
These differences on national and federal level may be well traced in
Yugoslavia, (Blagojevic, 1999; Bunce, 1999), in Czechoslovakia, (Wolchik,
1990), in Poland, (Staniskis, 1991), in the Soviet Union (Bunce, 1999;59
Roeder, 1993; Derluguian, 1993), or in Romania (Verdery and Kligman,
1990).
Disintegration, collapse and transformation will occur at a different pace
where forced restructuring is taking place. In these cases, the status quo is
constantly being recreated without the necessity of changing priorities,
modernization, adaptation, and the creation of new resourceful units or
activities within or outside the reaches of the net. The economy and human
resources are exploited to their physical limits – as with Rumania at the end
of the 1980s, (Verdery and Kligman, 1990), North Korea still these days
(Eberstadt, 1998) or China during the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural
Revolution (Barnett, 1967; MacFarquhar, 1990). In these cases, collapse
will occur only when political opportunities expand and intra-elite conflicts
arise in consequence of such externalities as the (expected) death of the
leader or collapse of neighboring fractals (see Bunce,  1999). Until then,
forced restructuring will conserve the status quo for longer period. This will
conserve the controlling and overlapping capacity of the net while
economically undermining it. Therefore, collapse will probably be abrupt.
In this case, disintegration and transformation will occur in parallel
fashion, but only after the collapse.
Resource creating reforms occur when extraction capacity within
the unit is decentralized and the distribution of power within the unit is
such that resisting capacity of sub-units is high, therefore IPS budget
constraints become hard. In these cases reforms are forced to create
resources or resourceful units outside the net before conditions of the
structure deteriorate. Resource drives will cause an escalation of reforms
here too. But, in consequence of the kind of reforms, this process increases
the alternative field to the net (alternative behavior, activity,
organization, property resources and rationality). By that token, these
reforms induce the relative shrinking of the net.
One of the ways to increase alternative field in China was the so-called
dual-track system since the first half of the 1980s. The dual-track, called as
the distinctive element of the Chinese reform process, refers to the
coexistence of traditional plan and market channel for the allocation of the
given good. Dual-rack implies the existence of a two-tier pricing system for
the goods under that system: a single commodity will have both a (typically
low) state-set planned price and a (typically higher) market price. If plan
was fulfilled, the rest of the produced commodity was allowed to be sold at
market prices. Through these instruments, enterprises increasingly learned
how to operate outside the plan, a market sector evolved through direct
sales, increased revenues. The chance was higher for smaller enterprises,60
since large ones were monitored more closely, their price could not deviate
from what the state determined, and when goods became scarce, the
planners cut back the proportion of goods the large enterprises could
market directly (Naughton, 1996 p. 8.; Jin and Haynes, 1997; Qian and Xu,
1993; Smyth, 1998).
However, the resource creating reforms will make the net shrink in
absolute terms too. One of the reasons for that is the drive for transferring
burdening and non-strategic sub-units outside the net or the unit (which
overlaps with resource mobilizing efforts). These actions not only decrease
the number of sub-units attached to the net and, in exchange, increase the
amount of extracted and redistributable resources within the net, but will
also provide the unit with resourceful entities outside the net. The other
reason for the absolute shrinking of the net is the attraction of the alternative
options of resource acquisition outside the net. Options will motivate
decision-makers to partially or definitely flee out, and thereby vacate the
rigid structures within the net. This will take place either by joining the new
field, or attracting resources from outside the net (FDI)(Wu, Y., 1999). Both
privatization, alternative resource attraction and joining the field outside the
net will result in either automatic, or forceful retreat of the net in absolute
terms.
For example in privatized enterprises, joint ventures, and companies with a
foreign shareholding, the role of the Party will decrease both within the sub-
unit and within those controlling it through D1 and D2 lines. These events
may be traced in China both at joint ventures, at private enterprises
(Pearson, 1997) and even at SOEs that are transformed into companies and
listed on stock exchange (Interview, 2000), or analyzing the consequence of
foreign direct investments (Wu, Y., 1999).
Moreover, in consequence of available alternative resources, the
frequency of using the net also decreases. Consequently, the net will
gradually empty, while within the confines of the net, due to the main
characteristics, politically rational decision-making will prevail.  In
consequence of the relative, absolute shrinking, loosening and emptying, of
the net (taking place parallel to growing alternative outside it), the
transformation will take place parallel to disintegration, before collapse
occurs. However, this does not necessarily inhibit system-collapse. It
probably only contributes to the attenuation of the collapse.
In consequence of the fractal character both forceful resource rede-
ployments, resource mobilizing- and resource creating reforms as well
as collapses are taking place simultaneously. It is a question of the
complex structural specificity and state of condition of the given aggregation61
level, and that of its sub-units which one of them will be overwhelming and
what are the outcomes of their mutual influence. Reforms on the one hand,
conserve the system by either mobilizing, or producing resources to
redistribute. At the same time, with the differentiation in activities,
organizational, and positional structure they reduce the ability of the
dependency threads to "cover" the party and non-party structure. Moreover,
depending on structural specifics, they create a growing economic and social
field outside the net that offers alternative rationality, while within the net
politically rational behavior and forced paths of redistribution prevail. In
other words, they may loosen the system, make it retreat or, indeed, by
directly weakening the basic elements of the structure, throw the system into
disarray.  As a result, either one of the described means of resource
acquiring within party-states are simultaneously instruments of self-
support and paths to systemic self-destruction. What are the
consequences that we may draw from the above conclusion concerning
China and Hungary?
Based on the structural and dynamic criteria of the IPS model, we
argue that also the differences in the type, fate and outcome of reforms
in party-states are comparable.62
SUMMARY
Summarizing the arguments of this work we claim that the Integrated Party-
State (IPS) model (Csanádi,  1997) allows us to place the party-state
structures and their dynamics into a common framework. Starting from this,
the IPS model suggests that the structure and dynamics of party-state
systems are comparable. This possibility is theoretically demonstrated
along several dimensions:
(i)  The model reveals the structural background of the interdependency
between party-, state- and economic decision-makers. It describes the
basic elements of this structure, their connections and their underlying
principles of connection. This structure is formed by the dependencies
and interest promoting possibilities and the structurally inbuilt
inequalities concerning interest promotion. It reveals the similar
character of the elements and connecting principles of this
interpenetrating structure best described as a fractal (self-similar)
feature. We argue that this self-similarity will prevail, despite the
differences in time, space, levels of aggregation and the developing
or deteriorating condition of the structure. Based on this argument,
party-state  structures  are comparable as fractals. Therefore,
comparability will be sustained, despite extreme differences in the
size, geopolitical location, cultural specifics, historical traditions,
level of institutionalization, stage of societal development at the
time of party-state formation or at the time of departure from the
Stalinist model, etc.
(ii)  In consequence of the structural background, principles of operation
will induce political monopoly in the dependencies, the interest
promotion, and the extraction and redistribution of resources. This
will induce a characteristic behavior in the distribution of and in the
demand for resources and make the principles of operation in a fractal
unit self-similar. Our analysis suggests that in the process of self-
reproduction, both the allocation and the extraction of resources is
selective along the structural inequalities of interest promotion.
Criteria of selection are determined by the political rationality of
behavior produced by the characteristics of the structure and
operation, and the motivations stemming from them. We argue that in
consequence of the selectivity in the redistribution, it is not the soft
budget constraint of enterprises in general that characterizes party-
state systems, but rather the selective incidence of constraint within63
fractal units. Based on the common (self-similar) structural
background and dynamic principles, the IPS model suggests that the
principles of the dynamics of reproduction of party-state systems
are also comparable.
(iii)  The model reveals the structural background of the differences. These
differences develop in consequence of combinations of diverse
variations of the structural elements: the interlinking threads, the
feedback connections, and the level of extraction and distribution of
monopolized resources. These differences may take place in time, in
space, in different levels of aggregation of the same structure and in
different state of development of a structure. We argue, that
structural differences in the distribution of power and the
corresponding differences in the selective allocation of resources and
thus the soft/hard budget constraints in party-state systems are also
comparable.
(iv)  It has been argued here that budget constraints will be structure-
specific. Whether the budget constraints of a fractal unit during the
process of self-reproduction hardens or softens depends upon the
combination of the unit's bottom up bargaining and top-down
enforcing capacities during interactions. The complex interplay of its
structure-specific interactions introduces a new concept of budget
constraint in the framework of the IPS model. Structure-specific
budget constraint will induce structure-specific motivations and
behavior in the reproduction process. If budget constraints are soft,
the maintenance of status quo is the priority. If budget constraints
become hard, the unit will implement structure specific instruments to
extract further resources. From this point of view, the differences in
the dynamics, and the differences in the implementation of
different types of instruments of resource acquisition in party-
state systems are comparable.
(v)  The structure-conforming instruments will have different impact on
the structure, resulting in different outcomes in the given unit.
Depending on structural specifics, instruments of self-reproduction
may cause disintegration, collapse and transformation sequentially.
They may also cause parallel disintegration and transformation that
may occur either after the collapse or before it. In consequence of the
fractal character and the structural specifics, different structure-
conforming instruments may take place and have their impact in one
aggregated system simultaneously. For the same reason, reproduction,
collapse and transformation may occur simultaneously in different64
fractal units or their aggregations. Their combined impact will provide
the specific character of the dynamics of reproduction. Based on the
structural and dynamic criteria of the IPS model, we argue that
the differences in the kind of resource-acquiring instruments and
their different consequences on the process of self-reproduction in
party-state systems are also comparable.65
REFERENCES
Antal, L. (1979):  Fejlődés kitérővel. A magyar gazdaság mechanizmusa a
hetvenes években [Development with a Detour. The Hungarian
Econmic Mecanism in the 1970s]. PKI Közlemények 2. Budapest,
Pénzügykutatási Intézet [Institute of Financial Research]
Antal, L. (1983): Pénzügyi tervezés és szabályozás konfliktusai [The Con-
flicts Between Financial Planning and Management], Gazdaság, Vol.
17. N. 2, pp. 31–55.
Antal, L. (1985): Gazdaságirányítási rendszerünk a reform útján [Our
Economic Management and Financial Systems on the Path of Reform]
Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó
Arendt, H. (1966): The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt, Brace
Bachman, D. (1991): Bureaucracy, economy, and leadership in China. The
institutional origins of the Great Leap Forward Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, Port Chester Melbourne, Sydney
Barnett, A.D. (1967): Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in
Communist China. New York, Columbia University Press
Bauer, T. (1986): From Cycles to Crisis? Recent Developments in East
European Planned Economies and the Theory of Investment Cycles.
Wien, WIIW, Forschungsberichte WIIW n. 136, p. 32. 1986 as a book
in Hungarian: Tervgazdaság, beruházás, ciklusok [Planned Economy,
Investment, Cycles] Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó
Becker, J. (2000): Capitalists Infiltrating Party, Article Warns, in South
China.  Morning Post 14 July, 2000. Referred by Jason Kudopp, in
Trade with China Promotes Political Reform – period in China Online,
25 July, 2000
Bihari, M. (1985): Politikai rendszer és szocialista demokrácia [Political
System and Socialist Democracy] Politikatudományi Füzetek, 6.
Budapest
Blagojevic, M. (1999): Inastitutions in Serbia: From Collapse to What? In:
Institution Building in the New Democracies. Studies in Post-Post-
Communism (ed. Hans Georg Heinrich). Collegium Budapest, Institute
for Advanced Study, Workshop Series, pp. 43–85.
Bolton, P. (1995): Privatization and the Separation of Ownership and
Control: Lessons form Chinese Enterprise Reform. The Economics of
Transition Vol. 3 IV. 1. 1995 ECARE Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Brussels
Brown, K. (1992): Khabarovsk: Resurrecting the Nomenclatura. Russia at
the Grass Roots. Radio Free Europe, RL,  Research Report, pp. 26–32.66
Brzezinski, Z. K., and Huntington, S. (1964): Political Power USA/USSR
Chatto and Windus
Bunce, V. (1983): The Political Economy of the Breznev Era: Decline of a
Nation-state. British Journal of Sociology, 13. (January), pp. 129–158.
Bunce, V. (1985): The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern
Block from Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability. International
Organization, Vol. 39, No. 1, Winter,  pp. 1–46.
Bunce, V. (1989): Decline of a Regional Hegemon: The Gorbachov Regime
and Reform in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Society,
Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring, pp. 235–267.
Bunce, V. and Csanádi, M.(1993): Uncertainty in the Transition. Post-
Communism in Hungary. East European Politics and Society, Vol. 7.,
No. 2. Spring, pp. 240–275.
Bunce, V. (1999): Subversive Institutions The design and the destruction
of socialism and the state. Cambridge Univerity Press, Cambridge
Bunce, V. (2000): Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded
Generalizations.  Comparative Political Studies Vol. 33, N. 6/7
August–September, pp. 703–734.
Burns, J. P. (1983): Reforming China's Bureaucracy 1979–82. Asian Survey,
Vol. 23, No. 6.  Berkeley, CA, June, pp. 692–722.
Burns, J. P. (1987): China's Nomenklatura System. Problems of Commu-
nism, Vol. 36 no. 5, pp. 38–51.
Burns, J. P. (1989) The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System.
Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe
Burns, J. P. (1994): Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Se-
lection: The 1990 Nomenklatura. China Quarterly, November, pp.
692–722.
Chamberlaine, H. (1987): Party-Manager Relations in Chinese Industries:
Some Political Dimensions of Economic Reform'. China Quarterly,
No. 112, December, pp. 631–661.
Chen, C. J.  (1999): Local Institutions and the Transformation of Property
Rights in Southern Fujian. In: Property Rights and Economic Reform
in China (eds.: Oi, J.C. and Walder, A. G.). Stanford University Press,
Stanford, pp. 49–70.
Child, J. and Xinzhong (1991): The Communist Party's Role in Enterprise
Leadership at the Highwater of China's Economic Reform. Advances in
Chinese Industrial Studies, Vol. 2. The Changing Nature of
Management in China (ed. by Cambell, N.; Plasschaert S. R.F. and
Brown, D.). Greenwich CT: JAI Press,  pp. 39–46.67
Csanádi, M. (1989a): A pártállamrendszer szerkezete, kohéziója és szétesése
Magyarország példáján [The Hungarian Example on the Structure,
Cohesion and Disintegration of Party-states]. Gazdaság, 23 (4), pp. 5–36.
Csanádi, M. (1989b): Farewell Symphony. The New Hungarian Quarterly,
N. 118, pp. 53–57.
Csanádi, M. (1990): Beyond the image: The case of Hungary. Social
Research, Vol. 57, No. 2., pp. 321–346.
Csanádi, M. (1991): The diary of decline: The case study of the disinte-
gration of the Party in one district in Hungary. Soviet Studies, Vol. 43,
No. 6., pp. 1085–1100.
Csanádi, M. (1997a): The Legacies of Party-states for the Transformation.
Communist Economies, Economic Transformation Vol. 9. No. 1.,
pp. 61–85.
Csanádi, M. (1997b):  Party-states and their Legacies in Post-communist
Transformation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA,
USA
Csanádi, M. and Lőrincz, A. (1992): Neural Network Formalization of the
Hungarian Party-state System. Behavioral Science, Vol. 37, pp. 81–108.
Comisso, Ellen, "Market failures and market socialism: Economic problems
of the transition", in Eastern European Politics and Societies, Vol. 2,
No. 3, 1988 pp. 433-65
Derluguian, G. H. (1993): 'The tale of two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria
before and since the Soviet collapse. Manuscript, Ithaca, Cornell
University
Eberstadt, N. (1998):  North Korea's Interlocked Economic Crises: Some
Indications from "Mirror Statistics". Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII,
N. 3, March, pp. 203–231.
Fainsod, M. (1958): Smolensk under Soviet rule. Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press
Friedrich, C. J. and Brzezinski, Z. K. (first ed. in 1956, revised in 1965):
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Praeger
Friedrich C.J., Curtis, M. and Barber, B. R. (1969):  Totalitarianism in
Perspective: Three Views. Praeger
Gelb, A., Jefferson G. and Singh, I. (1993): Can Communist Economies
Transform Gradually? The Experience of China. In: Blanchard, O. and
Fisher, S. (eds.): NBER Macroeconmics Annual. Cambridge, MIT
Press, pp. 87–133. Commented by Perkins, D. H. and Sachs, J. on pp.
133–149.
Goodman, D. S.G and Segal, G (eds.) (1994): China Deconstructs.
Routledge, London, NY.68
Gordon, R. H. and D. D. Li (1997): Government Distributional Concerns
and Economic Policy During the Transition from Socialism. Transition
Economics, N. 1662. Discussion paper series, Centre fo Economic
Policy Research, London
Granick, D. (1990): Chinese State Enterprises: A Regional Property Rights
Analysis Chicago. Chicago University Press
Grossman, G. (1983): The party as manager and entrepreneur, from
entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. In: G.
Guroff, G. and Carstensen F.G. (eds.) Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey
Groves, T., Yongmiao, H., McMillan, J. and Naughton, B (1994):
Autonommy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 No. 1, pp. 185–209.
Guthrie, D. (1999a): Dragon in a Tree/Piece/Suit: The Emergence of
Capitalism in China. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
Guthrie, D. (1999b): The Declining Significance of Guanxi in  China's
Economic Transiton. China Quarterly, N.157 pp. 254–282.
Halpern, N. (1989): Economic Reform and Democratization in Communist
Systems. The Case of China. Studies in Comparative Communism Vol.
22. N. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn) pp. 139–152.
Harmin, C. L. (1992):  The Party Leadership System. In: Bureaucracy,
Politics and Decision-making in Post-Mao China (eds.: Lieberthal, K.
G., D. M. Lampton) University of California Press Berkeley, LA,
Oxford
Hayek, J. (1975):  Collectivist Econmic Planning. Reprints of Economic
Classics. Augustus and Kallei Publishers, Klifton
Hough, J. (1969): The Soviet prefects. Cambridge MA, Harvard University
Press
Hough, J. and Fainsod, M. (1979): How the Soviet Union is governed?
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press
Huang, Y. (1990! Web of Interest and Patterns of Behaviour of Chinese
Local Economic Bureaucracies and Enterprises during Reforms. China
Quarterly, N. 123 (September), pp. 431–458.
Huang, Y. (1996): Inflation and Investment Controls in China. The Political
Economy of Central -Local Relations During the Reform Era. New
York, Cambridge University Press
Huang, Y. (2000): Internal and external reforms: Experiences and lessons
from China' Part I. ChinaOnline News, 20 Sept.
Jefferson, G. (1998): China's State Enterprises: Public Goods, Externalities
and Coase. American Economic Review, 88, 2, pp. 428–432.69
Jin, D. and K. E. (1997): Economic Transition at the Edge of Order and
Chaos: China's Dualist and Leadng Sectoral Approach.  Journal of
Economic Issues, Vol XXXI No. 1 March , pp. 79–100.
Kennedy, S.(2000): In the Company of Markets. The Transformation of
Chinese Political Economy. Doctoral dissertation in progress, George
Washington University. Referred by Kindopp, J., in: Trade with China
Promotes Political Reform-period. ChinaOnline, 25 July
Kornai, J. (1959): Overcentralization in Econmic Administration: A critical
Analysis Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry. London,
Oxford University Press
Kornai, J. (1980): Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam–New York–Oxford,
North-Holland
Kornai, J. (1990): Vision and Reality, Market and State. Contradictions and
Dillemas Revisited.  Budapest, Corvina
Kornai, J. (1992): The Socialist System. The political Economiy of
Communism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.,
Kovács, J. M. (1980): Alku, asszimilació, alku [Bargaining, assimilation,
bargaining]. In: Tardos, M. (ed.): Vállalati magatartás, vállalati
környezet [Enterprise behaviour, enterprise environment]. Budapest,
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó
Laki, M. (1991): Barriers to privatization in Hungary. In: Special issue of
Review of Industrial Economics, pp. 38–45.
Lamberger, G. (1988): Nagy kompromiszumok, csekély sikerek [Big com-
promises, shallow successes]. Külgazdaság, Vol. 32, N. 2-3, pp. 412–419.
Lane, D. (1976):  The Socialist Industrial State. Towards a Political
Sociology of State Socialism. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
Lee, H. Y.,  (1978):  The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.
Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
Lieberthal, K. and Oksenberg, M. (1988): Policy Making in China. Leaders,
Structures, and Processes Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press
Lin, C. Z. (1989): Open-Ended Economic Reform in China. In: Nee, V. and
Stark. D.(eds.): Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism
China and Eastern Europe. Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press,
pp. 95–136.
Li, D. (1998): Changing incentives of the Chinese bureaucracy. American
Journal of Economics, May, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 393–397.
Lin, J. Y., Fang, C. and Li Zou (1995): Why China's Ecomomic Reforms
have been Successful? Implications for Other Reforming Economies
China Centre for Economic Research. Working Papers No. E1995002
Beijing, Peking University70
Liu, Ya-ling (1992): Reform from Below: The Private Economy and Local
Politics in the Rural Industrialization of Wenzou. China Quarterly, No.
130 (June) pp.293–316.
MacFarquhar, R. (1972, 1983): The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. 2
vol. New York, Columbia University Press
Mandelbrot, B. B. (1983): The Fractal Geometry of Nature. San Francisco,
Freeman and Co.
Manion, M. (1985): The Cadre Management System, Post Mao: The
Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State
Leaders. China Quarterly, No. 102, June, pp. 203–233.
McKinnon, R. I. (1993): Gradual versus Rapid Liberalization in Socialist
Economies: The Problem of Macroeconomic Control (pp. 63–94),
including comments by Aslund, A. and Rostowski, J. (pp. 95–112).
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development
Economies
McMillan, J. and Naughton, B. (1992): How to Reform a Planned Economy.
Lessons from China. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8. Spring. pp.
130–143.
Montiola, G., Yingy Qian and Weingast, B. R. (1995): Federalism Chinese
Style: The Political Economy for Economic Success in China. World
Politics, 48, 1, October, pp. 50–81.
Naughton, B. (1991): The Pattern and Legacy of Economic Growth in the
Mao Era. In: Kallgren, J., Lieberthal, J., MacFarquhar, R., and
Wakeman, F. (eds.): Perspectives on Modern China: Four
Anniversaries. Armonnk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, pp. 226–254.
Naughton, B. (1994):  Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization
from Below. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings
84. pp. 266–270.
Naughton, B. (1996): Growing Out of the Plan Chinese economic Reform
1978–1993. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Oi, J. C. ( 1985): Communism and Clientelism: Rural Politics in China.
World Politics, 37. n. 2 (Jan), pp. 238–266.
Oi, J. C. (1992): Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundation of Local State
Corporatism in China. World Politics,  45, N. 1. October, pp. 99–126.
Oi, J.C. (1996): Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village
Self-governance. China Review (ed. Brosseau, M., Pepper, S. and Shu-
ki, T.) Ch UP,  pp. 131–152.
Oi, J.C. (1995): The Role of local State in China's Transitional Economy'.
China Quarterly, Vol. 133, pp. 1132–1145.71
Pacepa, I. M. (ed.) (1989): Vörös horizontok: Egy román kémfőnök
vallomásai. I.H. Printing Enterprise
Pearson,  M. M.  (1997): China's New Business Elite. The Political
Consequences of Economic Reforms. University of California Press,
Berkeley, L. A. London
Perotti, E. (1993): Bank Landing in Transition Economies. Journal of
Bank Finance 17, 5. pp. 1021–1032.
Perotti, E., Sun, C., Liang, L.Z. (1999): State Owned versus Township and
Village Enterprises in China. Comparative Economic Studies XLI, No
2-3 Summer /Fall, pp. 151–179.
Perry, E. and Wong, C. (1985): The Political Economy of Reform in Post-
Mao China. Cambridge, London, Harvard University Press
Portyakov, V. (1991): The Financial Market in China. Far Eastern Affairs,
No. 2.
Qian, Y. (1996): Enterprise Reform in China: Agency problems and Political
Control. Economics of Transition, 4 (2), pp. 427–447.
Qian, Y. and Roland, G. (1998): Federalism and Soft Budget Constraint. The
American Economic Review, Vol.88, 5., pp. 1143–1162.
Qian, Y. and Weingast, B. (1997):  Federalism as a Commitment to
Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.
11. N.4 Fall, pp. 83–92.
Qian Y. and Xu Ch. (1993): Why China's Economic Reforms Differ: the M-
form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-state Sector.
Economics of Transition, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 135–170.
Rigby, T. H. (1988): The Origins of the Nomenklatura System. Soviet
Studies, Vol. XL, No.4, pp. 523–537.
Roeder, Ph. G. (1993): Red Sunset. The Failure of Soviet Politics. Princeton,
N. J., Princeton University Press
Schapiro, L. (1970): The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York,
Vintage Books
Shambaugh, D. (1992): 'The Soldier and the State: The Political Work System
in the People's Liberation Army'. China Quarterly, 1992, pp. 526–568.
Shirk, S. (1990): Playing to the Provinces: Deng Siao Ping's Political
Strategy of Economic Reform.  Studies in Comparative Communism,
Vol. 23, pp. 230–242.
Shu Y. Ma (1998): The Chinese Route to Privatization: The evolution of the
Shareholding System Option. Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII, N. 4. April,
pp. 379–398.72
Shu-ki, T. and Yuk-shing, Ch. (1994): China's Tax. Reforms of 1994. Break-
through or Compromise? Asian Survey, XXXIV, N. 9, September,
pp. 769–788.
Shuhfan, D. (1987): The party-state Relationship in China, 1978–1986.
Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Schoold of the University of
Notre Dame, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree
of PhD, Dept. of Gov. and International Studies, UND, june 1987
Silberman, B. (1982): State Bureaucratization: A Comparative Analysis.
Department of Political Science, the University of Chicago
Skocpol, T., Evans, P., Reushemeyer, D. (eds.) (1985): Bringing the State
Back In. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Smyth, R. (1998): Recent Developments in Rural Enterprise Reform in
China: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. Asian Survey, Vol
XXXVIII. No. 8., pp.784–800.
Solnik, S. (1996): The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and
China. A Neoinstitutional Perspective. World Politics, January, No. 48,
pp. 209–238.
Soós, K. A. (1986): Le role de la monaie et des organes financieres dans le
fases descendentes des cicles en Hongrie at en Yugoslavie. Regulation
cicles et crises dans les econmies socialistes. Sous la direction
Chavance, B. Paris, EHESS, 1987 as a book in Hungarian: Terv,
kampány, ciklusok  [Plan, Campaign, Cycles]. Budapest, Közgazdasági
és Jogi Könyvkiadó
Szalai, E. (1989): Gazdasági mechanizmus, reformtörekvések és
nagyvállalati érdekek [Economic mechanism, reform aspirations and
large enterprises' interests]. Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi
Könyvkiadó
Staniszkis, J. (1991): The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe.
The Polish Experience University of California Press, Berkeley, L. A.,
Oxford
Steinfeld, E. S.  (1998): Forging Reform in China. The Fate of State Owned
Industry (Cambridge, 1998), Cambridge University Press
Sun, L. (1997): Emergence of Unorthodox Ownership and Govenrance
Structures in East Asia. An Alternative Transition Path. Research for
Action 38 UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research
(UNU/WIDER)
Tarkowski, J. (1990): Endowment of nomenklatura, of apparatchiks turned
into entrepreneurchiks, from communist ranks to capitalist riches.
Innovation, Vol. 14, No. 1, Vienna73
Tellér, Gyula, 'Ómechanizmus. újmechanizmus, ipari szövetkezetek' ('Old
mechanism, new mechanism, industrial cooperatives'), in Medvetánc,
Vol. 4, Nos. 4-1, 1984-85, pp. 143-68
Tellér, Gy. (1987): Adalékok a szövetkezetek gazdasági, szervezeti és jogi
reformjahoz [Contributions to the economic and organizational reforms
of cooperatives]. Budapest, MTA Államtudományi Kutatások Prog-
ramirodája
Tong, Y. (1997):  Transitions from State Socialism. Economic and Political
Change in Hungary and China. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
London, Boulder, New York, Oxford
Verdery, K. and Kligman, G. (1990): Romania After Causescu. Post-
communist Communism? Eastern Europe in Revolution' Conference
paper. Yale University, November
Volensky, M. (1984): Nomenklatura: The Soviet ruling class – an insider's
report. New York, Doubleday and Co.
Voszka, É. (1988): Reform és átszervezés a nyolcvanas években [Reform
and reorganisation in the 1980s]. Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi
Könyvkiadó
Voszka, É. (1997): A dinoszauruszok esélyei [The Chances of Dinosaurs]. ,
Budapest, Pénzügykutató Rt and Perfect Publisher
Walder, A. G. (1988): Communist Neo-Traditionalism. Work and Authority
in Chinese Industry. Berkeley–Los Angeles– London, University of
California Press
Walder, A. G. (1988): Bargaining Relationships in Urban industrial
Bureaucracies. In: Lieberthal, K. and Lampton, M.D. (eds.): The
Evolving Structure of Authority in China
Walder, A. G. (1995): Local governments as industrial firms: and
Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy. AJS, Vol
101, pp. 263–301.
Wank, D. L. (1996): Institutional Process of Market Clientelism in a South
China City: Guanxi in Private Business. China Quarterly, 147,
pp 820–838.
Wang, Xiao-qiang (1998): China’s Price and Enterprise Reform. London,
Mackmillan Press Ltd.
Wildasin, D. E. (1997): Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget
constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. Mimeo, Vanderbilt
University
Wolchik, S. L. (1998): Prospects for Political Change in Czechoslovakia'.
Paper prepared for presentation at the meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Associaton, Chicago, 14 April74
Wolchik, S. L. (1990): Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution. Current
History, 89 (551), pp. 413–416.
Wong, Ch. (1985): Material Allocation and Decentralization: Impact of the
Local Sector on Industrial Reform. In: Perry, J.E and Wong, Ch. (eds.):
The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China. Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press, pp. 253–278.
Wong, Ch. (1986): The Economics of Shortage and Problems of Reform in
Chinese Industry. Journal of Comparative Economics 10. pp. 363–387.
Wong, Ch. (1991): Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline: the
paradox of fiscal decentralization in post-Mao China. China Quarterly,
N. 128, December, pp. 691–715.
Wong, Ch. (1992): Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: the
Problematic Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China. Modern China,
18 (2), pp. 197–227.
Wu, J. and Qian, Y. (1999): How Far Across the River? Paper prepared for
the Conference on Policy Reform in China at the Center of Research on
Economic Development and Policy Reform (CEDPR), Stanford
University, November 18–20.
Wing, Th.W. (1994a): The art of Reforming Centrally Planned Economies:
Comparing China, Poland, and Russia. Journal of Comparative
Economics Vol.18, N. 3, June, pp. 276–308.
Wing, Th. W. (1994b) Structural factors in the  economic reforms of China,
Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union. Economic Policy, Vol.
18, April, 1994
Wu, Y. (ed.) (1999): Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in
China New Horisons in International Business. Cheltenham, UK
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Wu Y. (1994): Comparative Economic Transformations: Mainland China,
Hungary, the SU and Taiwan. Stanford, Stanford University Press
Zhang, L. (1996): Chinese Central-provincial Fiscal Relationships,
Budgetary Decline and the Impact of the 1994 Fiscal Reform: and
Evaluation. The China Quarterly
Zhao, X. S. (1996): Spatial Disparities and Economic Development in China
1953–1992: a comparative Study Development and Change. 27, 1.
pp. 131–163.
Zemtsov, I. (1985): The Private Life of the Soviet Elite. New York, Craine
Russac
Zou, L. and Sun, L. (1996): Interest rate policy and Incentives of State-
owned Enterprises in the Transitional China. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 23 (3) December, pp. 292–318.75
Zu Liu Hu (1994): Social Protection, Labour Market Rigidity and Enterprise
Restructuring in China. IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, 2